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## Abbreviations and Acronyms

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AR</td>
<td>Annual Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>Chama Cha Mapinduzi</td>
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<tr>
<td>COSTECH</td>
<td>Commission for Science and Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSSC</td>
<td>Christian Social Service Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (United Kingdom)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIVOS</td>
<td>Dutch NGO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kiufunza</td>
<td>A teacher payment for performance research project</td>
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<tr>
<td>LME</td>
<td>Learning, Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoE</td>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
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<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSEK</td>
<td>Million Swedish Kroner</td>
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<td>MUSD</td>
<td>Million USD</td>
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<tr>
<td>MYR</td>
<td>Mid-Year Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>NBS</td>
<td>National Bureau of Statistics</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Government Organisation</td>
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<td>OGP</td>
<td>Open Government Partnership</td>
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<td>PO</td>
<td>President’s Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>RALG</td>
<td>Regional and Local Government</td>
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<td>REAG</td>
<td>Research and Evaluation Advisory Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sauti za Wananchi</td>
<td>A mobile phone survey platform</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDG</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goals</td>
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<td>SzW</td>
<td>Sauti za Wananchi</td>
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<tr>
<td>ToR</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>VfM</td>
<td>Value for Money</td>
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The Evaluation of Twaweza, the Tanzania part, was commissioned by The Embassy of Sweden in Tanzania. The evaluation was undertaken by NIRAS between February and May 2019 and was conducted by:

- Svend Erik Sørensen, Team Leader
- Rasmus Hundsbaek Pedersen, Researcher and Civil Society Expert
- Deograsias Mushi, Economist and Local Expert

Kristoffer Engstrand managed the process at NIRAS Sweden. Niels Dabelstein provided quality assurance. Stephen Chimalo managed the evaluation at the Embassy of Sweden, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Twaweza started in 2009 as an ambitious initiative working on enabling citizens to exercise agency, promoting government to be more open and responsive, and improving basic learning for children in Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda. Twaweza has just completed implementing its Strategy 2015-2018. The theory of change of the Strategy is grounded in two domains, basic education and Open Government, and supported by a Learning, Monitoring and Evaluation (LME) unit.

The Embassy of Sweden in Dar es Salaam has supported Twaweza since 2016 with 48 MSEK for the three years 2016-2018 for activities carried out in Tanzania. The support is provided within Swedish development strategy for Tanzania 2013-2018. The Terms of References (ToR) highlight that focus of the evaluation should be on the organisational development benchmarks; the outcome, quality of outputs, and reach; as well as an assessment of the contribution to the overarching goals of Twaweza.

The report outlines the content of the Twaweza Strategy 2015-2018. It highlights the theory of change of the Strategy and addresses nine problem areas, five in Open Government and four in basic education, for which each has a number of sub-goals and success criteria as well as Twaweza’s activities and efforts on how to meet these criteria. The Strategy aims to provide ‘measurable impact’ on four dimensions by the end of 2018:

1. Children in school are learning as parents, teachers, school administrators and policy makers focus on measuring and improving the learning outcomes resulting from the large [social] investment in basic education.
2. Public authorities are responsive to public demand, and they promote and protect citizens’ right to high quality, relevant and meaningful information.
3. Citizens and civil society are asking for, getting and using information to improve their situation and engage public officials to deepen accountability and improve the quality of public service delivery.
4. Public and policy actors are using evidence-based knowledge to transforming governance practice and the provision of basic education.

The evaluation applied a theory of change approach. Progress and achievements for each evaluation criteria were assessed. The data collection methods included desk review of a wide range of documents provided primarily by Twaweza, including cases of four major interventions. Meetings were held and interviews conducted with a range of different stakeholders, including Twaweza management and key personnel, government officials and civil society organisations and a one-day people’s meeting in Kigoma.

Findings are presented along the lines of the evaluation criteria and are as follows:

**Relevance:** This section assesses to which extent the overall analytic approach to the Strategy has been relevant. The methodology applied by Twaweza in identifying ‘meaningful’ problems leading to the nine problem areas has formed the basis for the Strategy. They were aligned with donor and government priorities at the time and the evaluation considers the choice of problem areas fully legitimate. However, it could be argued, that relying on one methodological approach only may not reflect in full the local citizens’ perception of what are the real problems and concerns in education and government. A combination of different analytic approaches would most likely have identified new or nuanced areas of problems, particularly in the light of forming the foundation of a comprehensive 4-year strategy.
Secondly, while acknowledging that Twaweza has produced important evidence and data on service delivery in the first part of the Strategy period, less focus and reporting was observed during the second part. In a context where there is evidence that service delivery has the highest priority need among Tanzanian citizens, efforts to address this concern should probably have been prioritised higher on Twaweza’s agenda.

Thirdly, a relevance analysis of four major interventions was undertaken as part of the evaluation. The interventions were: (i) Sauti za Wananchi (a mobile phone survey platform), (ii) KiuFunza (a teacher payment for performance research project), (iii) the Kigoma-Ujiji local government intervention (coming out of the national and global Open Government Partnership, piloting local transparency and accountability) and (iv) the Election 2015 (linked to case studies of public agency demonstrating responsive government and/or active citizenship).

The four major interventions all fall within Twaweza’s overall theory of change, but the degree to which they refer to, reflect upon and feed back into the theory of change differed. The Sauti za Wananchi (SzW) was considered highly relevant; KiuFunza relevant yet reflecting the overall theory of change in a narrow way; Kigoma-Ujiji local government intervention highly relevant as Twaweza also moved increasingly towards local activity levels in 2017; and the Election 2015 was relevant focusing on active citizens and accountable politicians, though implementation turned out to be patchy.

Fifth, civic space in Tanzania was shrinking over the strategy period. Twaweza’s response was to develop a push back strategy that included coalition building, commenting on bills as well as more advocacy activities. Twaweza developed a profile as an organisation that dared speak out when others withdrew from the public debate. Whereas these approaches and activities were relevant to address the shrinking civic space as well as aligned with donor priorities more could have been done to revisit the overall Strategy and possibly re-strategise in the light of the changing context. While the strategy has been considered ‘ambitious’ by Twaweza at the same time it was acknowledged that the limitations in the civic space was already underway at the commencement of the Strategy – that is, in 2015. Important signs that Twaweza was reconsid- ering its approach within Open Government became pronounced in 2018. In the light of the shrinking civic space it could have been considered relevant to revise/adapt its strategic goal earlier in the strategy period.

**Effectiveness:** Activity, output and outreach levels have been high in almost all Open Government sub-problem areas. Data and data packages produced by Twaweza, particularly through SzW and Uwezo, have been important tools in establishing evidence based information to target groups, whether government officials, members of parliament (MP) or through various media outlets. They have also contributed to initiating important public debate in Tanzania. However, activities have been scattered and lack of follow-up to many of these has to a large extent reduced the ability of Twaweza to strengthen pathways towards outcome levels. Examples are shown in the report (Table 4). Whereas the shrinking of the civic space that gained momentum during the Strategy period may explain barriers to execute certain activities, Twaweza may have had more room for manoeuvring if (i) the ambitious goals had been revised following Tanzania’s departure from the Open Government Partnership, and (ii) results of activities undertaken were more systematically followed-up on within the context of the theory of change.

Activity, output and outreach levels in the education domain have also been high, in particular Uwezo and KiuFunza while less in curriculum development and school management. Data and data packages produced by Twaweza, particularly through Uwezo, have been important tools in establishing evidence based information to target groups, whether government officials, MPs or through various media outlets. In this area, Twaweza built on and sustained the
achievements in the previous strategy period that helped change the thinking on education and learning in Tanzania. As was the case with the open government domain, lack of follow-up on many of the activities undertaken by Twaweza has reduced the ability of Twaweza to strengthen pathways towards outcome levels.

The LME component has been successful in many respects by undertaking numerous monitoring and evaluation activities for learning purposes, helping foster a culture of learning within Twaweza. Main concerns relate to the lack of systematic and prioritised follow-up to activities that could have facilitated improved monitoring and evaluation at outcome levels. As such the LME’s efforts to become an integral part in furthering the theory of change has only been somewhat successful.

Organisational benchmarks achieved over the 2015-2017 period are at an average percentage of 58.5%. Looking at ‘What Works’ benchmarks only for the two domains (Open Government and basic education) the score is, for the three years, 38%. This cannot but be viewed as unsatisfactorily, even considering the restrictiveness of the civic space. With that framework in mind we consider the overall achievement level, 58.5%, somewhat satisfactory.

**Efficiency:** The efficiency section looks into (i) the value for money of the Twaweza strategy period and (ii) the partnership development.

**Value for money (VfM):** The relative costs of the Strategy have been compared with two like-minded national organisations and intend to give a wide picture of the relative local costs of the Strategy with a caveat that Twaweza is regionally based, yet with a separate budget operating in Tanzania. Twaweza’s activities are relatively more expensive and VfM challenged further by reduced impact achievements. On the other hand, several activities performed by Twaweza may to a reasonable degree justify a higher cost level, including Twaweza operating on a regional scale, strong support to partners - including the development of joint concepts for projects and organisational support- and generally focus on development of human resources.

Twaweza spent about 75% of its planned budget on the implementation of the Strategy. Recruitment and procurement processes remained competitive and Twaweza has a procurement policy that guides on all procurement of goods and services, and it ensures that there is VfM through an open competitive bidding system for all procuring units. Staff recruitment is based on a competitive approach by advertising job vacancies in newspapers, on websites, and also by the use of recruitment agents. Improved infrastructure and the automation of financial management functions have made Twaweza an efficient organisation. Easy access to data and Twaweza information is however problematic when opening its website. Its search machine is highly inadequate not answering satisfactorily to simple search criteria.

**Partnership development:** During the implementation of its 2015-2018 Strategic Plan, Twaweza partnered with at least 20 development actors, both government and non-government. Sixteen out of the 20 partners entered into formal contracts or MoUs, indicating a sufficient degree of efficiency applied by Twaweza in its relationship with partners as most MoUs specify responsibilities and tasks, as well as expected outputs and deliverables. As mentioned above Twaweza has overall contributed to the development of successful partnerships as well as contributed to strengthening the performance of individual partner organisations, including inspiring organisations, to think more innovatively and providing tools for organisational development. Concerns were raised by partners working in the Open Government domain, which have affected the efficiency of Twaweza’s work. These include, among others, that people in general are expressing genuine fear of speaking up as regards the political situation in the country.
**Sustainability:**

**Basic education:** Twaweza’s close work with the government in the education sector produced some sustained benefits, including on the curriculum; the continuity of Uwezo and SzW data production based on need/demand from numerous stakeholders; an MoU on Kiufunza with Ministry of Education and Ministry of Local Government; sustained perception among education sector stakeholder to focus on learning rather than infrastructure. The fact that government institutions were involved in work processes from the early stages of the basic education component has most likely catered for more sustained results.

**Open Government:** In comparison to the education problem area, efforts to develop sustained benefits in the Open Government domain have been less obvious due to the gradually more restrictive approach to civic space from the government, but also because Twaweza did not follow-up on completed activities and outputs. Still Twaweza managed to contribute in collaboration with other civil society partners and also, facilitated by a World Bank investment funding to the government, to improve the Access to Information Act in 2015 and 2016. Whereas Twaweza gradually developed a push back approach to restrictions in civic space that included commenting on bills and advocacy activities, Twaweza did not systematically seek other types of more institutionalised collaboration with the national government as the latter’s interest in the Open Government Partnership waned. Whereas there are some examples of ad hoc collaboration with government institutions on the collection of data, it should, however, also be acknowledged that establishing such collaboration is challenging in the current context.

Sustained (or near sustained) benefits facilitated by Twaweza have included the birth of a new and independent organisation, Wajibu Institute for Public Accountability; public agency results including construction of schools; capacity building, while often not formalised by Twaweza, has created skills and knowledge development that partners can use. With regard to sustaining Twaweza as a learning organisation, the institutionalisation of the Research and Evaluation Advisory Group (REAG) and the strengthening of the LME unit (through staff expansion) are strong indicators that a continuous and sustained learning culture in Twaweza beyond the strategy period has been fostered. Financially, while a continuous struggle, Twaweza has survived as it has managed to persuade donors of its ‘alternative’ approach to development and thus donors’ willingness to credit this.

**Impact:** The activities carried out by Twaweza over the strategy period have been many, as documented in this report, yet have had little overall impact when referring to the four dimensions outlined in the Strategy and the theory of change. It was obviously a highly ambitious strategy that Twaweza took on in 2015. Even before the setbacks in 2015 onwards, civic space was restricted in Tanzania. A precondition for achieving a measurable impact was thus the continued democratisation and expansion of civic space in Tanzania. This did not occur, and government restrictions increased. These factors also points to the fact that the government may play a bigger role than reflected in Twaweza’s theory of change.

**Lessons learned:** The Strategy 2015-18 Twaweza had as its point of departure that lasting changes are driven by the actions of motivated citizens. A main means to achieve this is informed public debate, which in turn will promote responsive public authorities and influence policies and plans. However, this chain of actions and effects proved challenging during the strategy period as documented in this evaluation. This is partly related to the shrinking civic space during the strategy period, but it would have been challenging even prior to this development, also partly due to a fragmented activity approach by Twaweza.
When it comes to achieving sustained change, Twaweza’s more tangible outcomes come from sustained engagement with key decision-makers and government authorities related to solid evidence from research and data platforms like Uwezo and Sauti za Wananchi. Data on service delivery has attracted the attention of government authorities throughout the period and opened the door for interaction and allowed for influence, not least in the education sector.

By comparison, Twaweza lost its platform for interaction in the Open Government element of its work with the government withdrawal from the Open Government Partnership at the end of 2017 and it did not manage to establish new ones on a sustained basis. As a reaction to this, Twaweza developed a push back approach to the shrinking civic space over the strategy period. This included the analysis of and commenting on bills, coalition building with other NGOs, more localised activities as well as an increased emphasis on advocacy, not least related to the laws affecting civic space.

Whereas there is evidence that such activities produced some results early in the strategy period, the effect later in the period is unclear from Twaweza’s reporting. They also pose a risk to Twaweza’s activities as demonstrated with the blocking of further publication of SzW data from the middle of 2018 onwards.

Major changes in the new strategy (2019-2022) and its theory of change include the divesting of the basic education work to a new entity, more activities with change agents and local governments in selected areas and playing down the ambition to foster a responsive government at the national level, at least in the short term. Twaweza at the national level will then amplify local experiences. Whereas most vision and values from the old Strategy are upheld, the mission has changed from collecting evidence to inspire citizens and stimulate responsiveness from authorities. The new strategy aims at demonstrating how citizen can come together and address problems, enable them to be heard, and promote and protect civic space. The main lesson in this context is that people may come together to address problems, but these problems should clearly reflect perceived and actual needs and demands by citizens (and local officials). Otherwise Twaweza’s efforts may eventually be in vain.

The changes provide for a less ambitious approach. At the same time, it can also be seen as both more and less realistic in terms of what an NGO can achieve in Tanzania in terms of sustained outcomes. It can be seen as more realistic in that the measurable impacts are more process oriented and focusing on gradual improvements. It can be seen as less realistic in that it takes citizen agency as its point of departure. As demonstrated in this evaluation, evidence on the effect of citizen agency is limited.

In this regard it is also worth noting that the lessons from Twaweza’s first strategy period summarised in the 2015-18 Strategy suggest that ‘some of our notable successes were achieved precisely in the policy environment and less where we had expected it: change driven by citizens’ (p. 7). Similarly, the new strategy suggests that ‘the overall citizen agency picture – seeking information, monitoring delivery, speaking out in public and taking action – is complicated and generally weak’.

It is unclear what role providing data and data packages on service delivery, which hitherto has been a key component and opened the door to engagement with government authorities, is to play.
Conclusions

Relevance

1) The Strategy has become increasingly challenged during the Strategy period 2015-2018 as the increasing shrinking civic space made it harder to influence government policies and actions through the public debate and deliberations envisioned in the Strategy.

2) Conformity has been observed between Twaweza’s priorities and the policies and needs/demand from donors, intermediate actors, such as media and other CSOs.

3) The four major interventions all fall within Twaweza’s overall theory of change, but the degree to which they refer to, reflect upon and feed back into the theory of change differed. The SzW was considered highly relevant; KiuFunza relevant yet very narrowly reflecting the overall theory of change; Kigoma-Ujiji local government intervention highly relevant as Twaweza also moved increasingly towards local activity levels in 2017; the Election 2015 was relevant focusing on active citizens and accountable politicians, though implementation turned patchy.

4) Twaweza did not change fundamentally the theory of change during the implementation of the Strategy, though the increasing civic space restrictions occurred and there was a switch from a national-oriented focus early on in the period towards a more decentralised focus during the latter part of the period. Important reflections on the overall approach and strategy can be observed towards the end of the strategy period.

5) Activities on evidence and data on service delivery seems to some extent to have been reduced in the second half of the Strategy period or at least they are not reported on to the same extent as in the first half. However, data shows that citizens prioritise service delivery and that focusing on service delivery is recommended in the 2014 evaluation.

6) Twaweza limited itself in identifying key problems and concerns for its theory of change and Strategy design as it applied its analysis on a single methodology only, the problem-driven iterative adaptation.

Effectiveness

7) Based on a detailed analysis of the two domains and the LME over the four year Strategy period, it is concluded that the activity level has been high in the two main domains, leading to numerous outputs, particularly as regards the ‘evidence’ side (data production) of the theory of change. These data are in a package format distributed online, through media and directly to government officials and politicians. They have contributed to public debates and overall reach at the intermediate outcome level, which is an important achievement in Tanzania. At the outcome level evidence on lasting and institutionalised change is limited.

8) The numerous activities and outputs related to data evidence production have been too scattered. Based on the documentation available to the team, follow-up on activities and intermediate outcomes produced in the two domains and LME have been limited. Opportunities to build up strength on results from activities that could lead towards intermediate outcomes and sustained outcomes have not been fully utilised.
Almost 60% of the Twaweza benchmarks were achieved over the 2015-2017 period, considered only a somewhat successful accomplishment despite the restrictive socio-political context.

The many different measurement tools applied by Twaweza (hypotheses, key metrics, benchmarks, outputs, outcomes, etc.) have been inefficient for effective measurement of progress and achievements of the Strategy. Twaweza has spent abundance of time on reporting on these as to meet transparency and accountability while simplified systems would have sufficed and achieved the same.

Efficiency

Twaweza spent about 75% of its planned budget for the implementation of the Strategy during the four years. This is considered relatively efficient considering the limitations put on the organisation as a result of the strained political context in the country, particularly during the last half-year of 2018.

A brief comparison based on basic parameters between Twaweza and two like-minded organisations shows that Twaweza’s operations are relatively more expensive. Twaweza is highly efficient as regards its management (operations and financial management), being highly automated and following recognised standards and principles. The website is however of poor quality and the time spent on reporting on many indicators of progress and achievements also indicates some degree of inefficiency.

16 out of 20 of Twaweza’s main partners entered into formal contracts or MoUs indicating a sufficient degree of efficiency applied by Twaweza’s in its relationship with partners. Yet, while collaboration has shown an overall ad hoc nature, there is no doubt that Twaweza has provided significant support to partners in their ability to become more innovative and enabled them to strengthen their organisations.

Sustainability

Partners’ perceptions of real and potentially sustained benefits produced in collaboration with Twaweza are high. 17 out of 20 partners claims sustainability if Twaweza would leave. However, limited evidence is provided as to verify such claims.

The close work with the government in the education sector produced some sustained benefits. Early involvement of government in work processes in the basic education domain has catered for such sustained results.

In comparison to the education problem area, efforts to develop sustained benefits in the Open Government domain have been less obvious. This is due to the gradual civic space restrictiveness imposed by the government, but also because of Twaweza’s less strategic focus in their choice of activities.

Twaweza contributed to policy change in the Open Government area, primarily through its inputs and improvements to the Access to Information Act. It further developed its activities on analysing and commenting on bills over the strategy period. Whereas the effect of these activities was not always clear, it did help inform decision makers and the public about the implications of upcoming legislation.

The LME has developed sustained institutionalised results with the creation of an internal advisory body on research and evaluation (REAG) and the staff expansion of the LME unit.
Impact

19) By the end of 2018, Twaweza wanted to have made a measurable impact on four development dimensions, i.e. school children for learning; authorities’ responsiveness to public demands; accessing information for deepened accountability; and transforming government practices based on evidenced knowledge. While these ambitious impacts were clearly aimed at by Twaweza, they were, apart from elements of the ‘school learning’, only achieved to a limited extent.

20) It was obviously a highly ambitious theory of change that Twaweza embarked upon in 2015. Even before the setbacks from 2015 onwards, civic space was restricted in Tanzania. A precondition for achieving the measurable impact was thus the continued democratisation and expansion of civic space in Tanzania. This did not occur, and government restrictions increased. These factors points to the fact that the government play a bigger role than reflected in Twaweza’s theory of change.

21) SDG data has been increasingly included in the Twaweza databases, particularly educational data (Uwezo) but also government related data, such as social sector data, including health and water.

Recommendations

Relevance

1. When Twaweza embarks on identifying key problems and concerns as well as assign major interventions, thorough and diversified analytic methods should apply. This will contribute to the design of a more realistic theory of change and development of improved pathways to its realisation.

2. Due to the fast changing socio-political context, the theory of change should be regularly subject to review, e.g. every sixth month.

3. Twaweza should re-think its approach to service delivery so as to better reflect the fact that evidence and data collection on service delivery are in demand as it is the most important need perceived by its main target group, Tanzanian citizens.

Effectiveness

4. Twaweza should continue to contribute to public debates in Tanzania through the generation of evidence and experiments, but balance thoughtfully this against development goals, that is, delivering and sustaining results.

5. Twaweza should continue its high activity level, follow-up on those activities that have potential to drive the theory of change forward, i.e. identifying improved pathways for improved opportunities for change.

6. Twaweza should review the results matrix, simplify, and continue describing activities and outputs and ensure that they are clear and logically linked towards effects. In the light of achieved outcomes – or the lack of them – regularly revisit the Strategy’s theory of change, including initiate alternative entries to problem analysis and adjust hypotheses and activities accordingly. The number of assessment tools should be reduced, including benchmarks.

7. In order to become more precise on how to achieve intermediate outcomes and outcomes, Twaweza should analyse and more clearly distinguish between what it can control itself, what it can influence directly or through partners, and what is required by other actors to achieve outcomes.
Efficiency

8. Twaweza should continue its efforts to improve its value for money, through, for example, continuous application of advanced technology, ensure that trained staff apply learned skills and when possible adjust salary levels.

9. Twaweza should expand on its partner networking, formalise relationships whenever possible but balance realistically against plans. Efforts should particularly be on supporting partners in their monitoring and evaluation knowledge and skills to ensure their ability to manage projects in general but particular those initiated/facilitated by Twaweza, a process in which Twaweza is already engaged.

Sustainability

10. Related to the fact that some of the main outcomes over the past strategy periods have been achieved through sustained engagement with government authorities, Twaweza should generally seek to engage these authorities prior to initiating major interventions and incentivise their continuous involvement and participation throughout the project cycle whenever possible.

11. Given the changing socio-political context in Tanzania, Twaweza may further develop its activities targeting and protecting the shrinking civic space, but it should maintain a core of activities related to data and work on service delivery, which have proved a main entry point to positive engagement with government authorities.

12. Overall, focus more on the building of organisational capacity of external partners and stakeholders as this will help institutionalise change. This is more important as Twaweza currently seems to be pivoting towards activities at the local level where capacity is often limited. It is also important in a context with increasingly centralised decision-making in order to build resilience towards pressure from central government.

13. Internally, develop scenarios with different trade-offs between working with the government (generating evidence on service delivery in a non-partisan way) and pursuing a watchdog push back approach. Based on these scenarios and thorough risk analyses identify the manoeuvrability of Twaweza in the current socio-political context and let the outcome help sustain Twaweza's future strategy and activities as well as its organisational structures.

Impact

14. Efforts have been made by Twaweza to achieve ambitious and measurable outcomes/goals. Yet, circumstances of repressiveness towards the civil space and Twaweza’s too activity-focused approach resulted in low impact. Forward-looking Twaweza should assess impact through development of pathways in which likelihoods of achievements are realistically designed.

15. Twaweza should continue to apply SDG data in both education and government areas when it coincides with its plans. SDGs, being a government responsibility Twaweza’s data collection, could be a one of several openings into collaboration with the government system for longer term effect.
1 Introduction

1.1 BACKGROUND

Twaweza\(^1\) started in 2009 as an ambitious initiative working on enabling citizens to exercise agency, promoting government to be more open and responsive, and improving basic learning for children in Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda. Twaweza has just completed implementing its Strategy 2015-2018. The theory of change of the Strategy is grounded in two domains: basic education and Open Government, and supported by a Learning, Monitoring and Evaluation (LME) unit.

Twaweza has its headquarters in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, where it (as from 2015) has been registered as a legally independent entity. It has certificates of compliance in Kenya and Uganda, as well as offices in Nairobi and Kampala. From 2009 until the end of 2014 it operated as a programme of the Dutch Hivos\(^2\) Initiative, and from 2015 to 2016 under Hivos’ oversight.

The Embassy of Sweden in Dar es Salaam has supported Twaweza since 2016 with 48 MSEK for the three years 2016-2018 for activities carried out in Tanzania. The support is provided within the Swedish development strategy for Tanzania 2013-2018, specifically Result Area 2 which focus on girls and boys’ access to education, and Result Area 3 which addresses improved democratic governance.

The evaluation has a sole focus on the Tanzania portfolio and related activities given the interest and domain of the Embassy of Sweden’s support to Twaweza’s Tanzania portfolio. The purpose of the evaluation is to:

- Serve as an input to Twaweza’s learning and future reflections on its newly developed strategic plan 2019 – 2021
- The evaluation will be used to inform the board of Twaweza and Twaweza’s third parties on Twaweza’s performance, challenges and recommended way forward
- Provide Sida and other donors supporting Twaweza with knowledge on Twaweza’s effectiveness and relevance in the current and future context.

The primary users of the evaluation report are:

- Twaweza as the organization is the primary user of the evaluation report
- Embassy of Sweden in Tanzania and other donors who are funding Twaweza, e.g. the Embassy of Denmark, DFID, Hewlett and Wellspring Advisors.

The secondary users of the evaluation report are:

- The government agencies and officials, especially Ministry for Regional and Local Government.

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\(^1\) Twaweza means ‘make it happen’ in Swahili.

\(^2\) www.hivos.org
The ToR highlight that focus of the evaluation should be on the organisational development benchmarks; the outcome, quality of outputs, and reach; as well as an assessment of the contribution to the overarching goals of Twaweza.

The evaluation took place in the period February to May 2019, with fieldwork carried out 10-22 March 2019.

1.2 TWAWEZA’S STRATEGY 2015-2018

The Twaweza Strategy 2015-2018\(^3\) presents the background to its vision, mission, values and theory of change, as well as its ‘problem driven’ approach to its three programme areas and LME, and mechanisms for organisational management, including governance, risks and financial management, and budgets.

The *vision* of Twaweza is the belief ‘in an open society, built on the human impulse to make a difference; where information and ideas flow, citizens engage, and authorities are accountable to the people.’\(^4\) The *mission* of Twaweza is the collection, curating and transporting of evidence, ideas, and stories to inspire citizen action and stimulate responsiveness from authorities on basic learning and Open Government.\(^5\) Values include being collaborative (embracing learning from others), being transparent and honest about failures, imaginative and curious, as well as rigorous (emphasising quality) and strategic. Twaweza’s theory of change reflects its vision and mission, i.e. outcome and outputs respectively.

Twaweza’s Strategy 2015-2018 focuses on three main programme areas and has an additional element on LME:

1. **Data and Voice**
   Data and Voice including Uwezo, Africa’s largest annual citizen assessment of children’s learning across hundreds of thousands of households; and Sauti za Wananchi, Africa’s first national representative frequent and rapid mobile phone-based survey.

2. **What works in basic education and Open Government**
   An ambitious program of gathering and generating evidence on “What Works” in the domains of basic education and Open Government. This includes experiments both small and large, and a focus on sourcing and understanding locally-generated solutions through a “positive deviance” approach;

3. **Public and Policy Communications and Engagement**
   Public and Policy Communications and Engagement produces various high-quality non-partisan products based on data and evidence, and engages relevant target audiences through a range of products and approaches (media partnerships, direct engagement with policy actors, etc.).

4. **Learning, Monitoring and Evaluation**
   Alongside the programmes is the Learning, Monitoring and Evaluation portfolio, which provides monitoring and feedback, engages external evaluations, contributes lessons to national and international forums and infuses the organization with accountability and a learning culture.

Twaweza adopted a problem-driven approach to both analysis and planning. This included the articulation of what was identified as ‘locally meaningful and well-defined problems’

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4 Ibid
5 Ibid
within the domains of basic education and Open Government. This approach is discussed under Relevance.

The Strategy identified nine specific ‘problems’ (problem areas); five in the Open Government domain and four in the basic education domain. They are:

**Open Government:**
- **O1.** There is no robust legislative basis and/or effective mechanisms through which to exercise the constitutional right to information.
- **O2.** The quality and integrity of data collected by government (on budgets, expenditures, natural resources and basic services) is poor and data are not made publicly available in a timely, systematic and meaningful fashion.
- **O3.** There is a lack of transparent and robust independent information monitoring the status of key services and sectors (in sectors such as health, water and natural resources); equally, there are no robust sources of opinions and perceptions of citizens about key services and sectors.
- **O4.** The number and capacity of intermediaries and curators who can demand information and data from the government and make it meaningful to the public (tell great stories) is limited.
- **O5.** For most citizens and public officials, government is generally unresponsive; this lowers expectations of what government can be and dulls aspirations, which in turn allows government to continue to be unaccountable (vicious cycle).

**Basic Education**
- **E1.** Schooling does not lead to learning; teachers, education administrators, policy makers, and the public (especially parents) do not focus on or measure core learning competencies (early grade literacy, numeracy and other core competencies).
- **E2.** The curriculum is too ambitious, and teaching is too far ahead of children’s learning levels. There is far too little evidence on effectiveness of curricula, and the little evidence available does not loop back to inform and stir change.
- **E3.** Teachers are not sufficiently motivated, supported and held accountable to ensure children learn.
- **E4.** Leadership, management and accountability of school systems are weak and unable to ‘pull together’ key constituencies (such as parents, teachers, school administrators, and the general community) to work in a concerted fashion to ensure that all children are learning.

For each of the problem area hypotheses, key metrics and success criteria have been identified for their respective testing, measurement and solutions. Furthermore, for each of the three main programme areas, the LME and organisational development and management (including governance, reporting, financial management and staff), annual and full strategy benchmarks were established. A risk management matrix was developed and mitigation strategies identified and an overview of foreseen country based budgets prepared. The total budget for Twaaweza Tanzania Strategy was estimated at 30,5 million USD, excluding regional and global activities in which Tanzania may be involved.

Annual and financial reports for 2015, 2016 and 2017 have been submitted as well as a mid-year report for 2018 (a full 2018 reports was submitted after the completion of the draft evaluation).
1.3 METHODOLOGY

1.3.1 Overall approach

Two overall approaches to the evaluation were applied: theory of change and contribution analysis.

Key features that make up a suitable theory of change model often include (i) the understanding of the context in which a project is able to influence change; (ii) the long-term change that the project seeks to support and for whose ultimate benefit; (iii) the logical sequence of the change that it is anticipated to lead to the desired outcome, and (iv) the assumptions about how these changes might happen.\(^6\)

The theory of change is primarily a process and not a product in itself and its prime goal is to reflect on and assess the causal mechanisms in the connections between outputs and outcomes of each programme area under the Strategy. For the theory of change to be useful, we asked key questions to Twaweza and key stakeholders about (i) how and why they think that the expected change will occur in the present Strategy construct, and (ii) whether they have evidence that support assumptions made in the theory of change – addressing the logical intervention from outputs through intermediate outcomes to outcomes (see Fig.1), and (iii) whether change – or non-change – corresponds with the perceptions of Twaweza and key stakeholders or whether changes have been brought about by other dynamics. This has been important for learning and contributed to addressing issues related to the new strategy 2019-2022, as can be observed in the Lessons Learned section of this evaluation.\(^7\)

The Strategy states that by the end of 2018, Twaweza wants to have made a measureable impact on the following four dimensions of community, national and regional life\(^8\):

1. Children in school are learning as parents, teachers, school administrators and policy makers focus on measuring and improving the learning outcomes resulting from the large [social] investment in basic education.
2. Public authorities are responsive to public demand, and they promote and protect citizens’ right to high quality, relevant and meaningful information.
3. Citizens and civil society are asking for, getting and using information to improve their situation and engage public officials to deepen accountability and improve the quality of public service delivery.
4. Public and policy actors are using evidence-based knowledge to transforming governance practice and the provision of basic education.

At the same time, the above impacts constitute the outcome of Twaweza’s theory of change. Its logic is presented in Fig. 1.

\(^7\) It was originally the intention that the evaluation should provide inputs to the design of the new strategy. However on 20 February 2019 the new strategy was launched officially on Twaweza’s website. This has not indicated any significant changes to the evaluation purpose or work, but has put it in a perspective that is outlined in the Lessons Learned section.
\(^8\) Twaweza Strategy 2015-2018, p. 10
The evaluation assessed progress and achievements of the nine problem areas and the LME process. The evaluation also assessed the overall approach to the design of the theory of change asking if the ‘problem driven’ methodology was sufficiently able to capture the core
issues and concerns in Open Government and basic education expressed by the Tanzanian people. Contribution analysis was applied best possible and throughout the evaluation following the guidelines outlined in the Inception Report (Annex 3).

1.3.2 Measuring progress and achievements

The Twaweza Strategy includes several indicators from where measurement of progress and achievements can derive, both at an annual basis as well as from the four-year strategy period. These include (i) the testing of the hypotheses presented in the Strategy, (ii) the associated key metrics identified for each of the nine problem areas in education and governance, annually as well as over the strategy period, (iii) the progress and achievements of outputs and outcomes related to identified success criteria under each of the problem areas, and (iv) the benchmarks for the entire strategy period for each of the four main programme areas (domains). The evaluation team discussed and considered how to address this measurement dilemma. The result is presented in Table 1.

Table 1. Evaluation criteria and measurement framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation criteria</th>
<th>Measurement framework</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relevance</td>
<td>• Theory of change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td>• Theory of change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Success criteria under the three domains (Open Government, basic education, LME) and related hypotheses and key metrics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Unit and organisational benchmarks on the three main programme areas (Data and Voice, What Works, and Public and Policy Engagement) and LME</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>• Value for money</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Partnership analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability</td>
<td>• Theory of change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact</td>
<td>• Theory of change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The four main impact areas highlighted in the Strategy (see above 2.3.1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the relevance assessment we first and foremost investigated four major interventions that was agreed between the evaluation team and Twaweza, comprising KiuFunza, Sauti za Wananchi, the 2015 Election and the Kigoma public agency experiment. The basis for the investigation was a case description prepared by Twaweza, including each intervention’s theory of change and its results.

The effectiveness assessment was primarily based on the Strategy 2015-2018 and the annual reports from 2015, 2016 and 2017 and the mid-year report 2018, as well as interviews conducted during the field visit to Tanzania in March 2019. The hypotheses of each of the problem areas, when clearly phrased, were tested and key metrics measured – based on very detailed descriptions of the narrative parts in the annual reports and the success criteria identified for each of the nine problem areas. Benchmark assessment was also included in the overall assessment.
The *efficiency* assessment focused on assessing the value for money (VfM) applying the DfID approach\(^9\) comparing Twaweza’s efficiency to two like-minded organisations, and an analysis of how efficient Twaweza has worked with its partners during the strategy period. As regards the VfM analysis limited data accessibility indicated that it was not been possible to undertake a comprehensive analysis.

The *sustainability and impact* assessments focused on the theory of change, i.e. (i) to which extent have Twaweza’s efforts and stated outputs followed pathways that have effectively influenced and contributed to the higher echelons of the theory, and (ii) assessed to which extent the benefits from activities undertaken have been sustained and have had impact.

Findings from the data collection, including documents, interviews with key stakeholders and case and Twaweza partner descriptions were triangulated forming a solid basis for assessing the evaluation criteria. With the above approach we have met the requirements of the evaluation focus, namely (p.3 in ToR):

- Organisational development benchmarks with a focus on progress on agreed benchmark in the period in which Twaweza became an independent organisation;
- Outcome, quality of outputs, and reach that includes a focus on value for money, and;
- Assessment of the contribution to overarching goals taking into accounts the changing socio-political context in Tanzania.

The latter issue, ‘taking into accounts the changing socio-political context in Tanzania,’ has been addressed throughout the evaluation and to the extent possible been analysed as closely as possible to specific activities undertaken by Twaweza during the strategy period. The process tracing approach has been related to the analysis of the extent to which the theory of change has been applied as an integrated and dynamic tool in Twaweza’s work as well as in the assessment of the extent to which Twaweza’s reported achievements were of Twaweza’s own making or involved other actors. A separate annex part of the report provides detailed analysis of relevance (case studies), effectiveness and benchmarks. See chapter 5 in Annex report.

### 1.3.3 Measuring progress and achievements

The data collection methods and process followed what was presented in the Inception Report (Inception Report, section 3.4, Annex 3). During the course of the evaluation, the team received a lot of relevant documentation from Twaweza, although some of it rather late. Twaweza provided detailed information on collaboration with all its key partners over the strategy period based on a format drafted by the team and Twaweza also drafted the case studies that formed the basis for the relevance assessment of four major interventions.

Focus group discussions were carried out with the Twaweza management group over two sessions and individual interviews conducted with managers and key personnel responsible for finance, operations, human resources, Sauti za Wananchi, Uwezo, public and policy engagement, LME and governance and external relations. Interviews were carried out with key stakeholders in Kigoma. These included the mayor, selected councillors, TAMASHA and Kigoma Development Initiative (KDI – both civil society organisations, and a focus group meeting with eight animators (organised through TAMASHA) and whose responsibilities are to fa-

\(^9\) See Inception Report (Annex 3). See also Limitations section 2.3.4.
cilitate and promote citizen agency in the Kigoma wards. National government officials’ in-
terviews were limited to the President’s Office, Regional and Local Government (PO-RALG) in
Dodoma. It was not possible to access key informants in the Ministry of Education (MoE). A
couple of follow-up interviews were carried out post-field work via Skype.

The team participated in a community meeting in Kigoma on 14 March 2019, in which mu-
nicipal councillors and representatives from the various Kigoma wards were represented, fa-
cilitated by TAMASHA – a very lively and interactive dialogue, with some solutions to local
problems encountered, between public officials and ward representatives from Kigoma-Ujiji
Municipality. Twaweza was effective in arranging the Kigoma visit, the meetings with its own
managers and staff as well as with a group of selected partners with whom Twaweza had
worked during the Strategy period. We commend Twaweza for its efforts for setting up these
arrangements successfully.

1.3.4 Limitations

The evaluation faced few problems. While most documents requested were received in due
time, other documentation was received late.

It was a challenge to address the assessment tools for the evaluation because Twaweza’s
reporting includes a wide range of measurement indicators’, including hypotheses, key met-
rics, success criteria, benchmarks and the ‘outputs/outcome’ matrices presented in the an-
nual reports as well as a forwarded ‘list of outcomes’ for 2015-2018 (3 April 2019). A signifi-
cant number of sub-goals under each problem area also meant that some activities are re-
ported several times under different guises.

The result of the team considerations regarding the application of assessment tools for each
of the evaluation criteria is the framework shown in Table 1. While it is well understood that
Twaweza has been keen to ensure transparency and performance measurement towards its
funders, too many tools were applied. Consequently, Twaweza seems to have spent abun-
dance of time on reporting on these while simplified systems would have sufficed.

The results of benchmark achievements cover three years, 2015-2017. Data from 2018 has
not been received. Benchmarks do not in all aspects differentiate clearly between countries,
which means that data are in several instances aggregated on a regional basis and not bro-
ken down to country level. For example, several of the Uwezo benchmarks data presented
are regional or two-country based. Furthermore, there are overlaps between benchmarks,
outputs and key metrics.

The evaluation team had to change two local consultants during the course of the evalua-
tion. While this caused discontinuity in the composition of the evaluation team, it did not
have any negative influences on the work of the evaluation team and the final outcome of
the evaluation.

Together with an analysis of partner collaboration, VfM constituted the other part of the effi-
ciency assessment. The VfM assessment included the comparison between Twaweza and two
like-minded organisations based on the data that was possible to obtain from these to or-
ganisations. Since the effectiveness element of the VfMs has been addressed in details in the
Effectiveness Assessment part of the report (see 2.2.4), the VfM addresses economy and ef-
ficiency. The VfM is not an in-depth study but includes data that has allowed for addressing
satisfactorily the DFID defined VfM approach.

There is some overlap in the descriptions of the four major interventions and selected prob-
lem areas, e.g. KiuFunza, and some repetition of text and analysis has therefore occurred.
However, as the major interventions relate to the relevance criterion and the problem areas relate to the effectiveness criterion, we have aimed at differentiating best possible during the analysis. Five cases were foreseen. One case was forwarded too late to be included in the draft report.

Clear indication of month and year of published (and non-published) documents should be an obvious requirement but is not in too many cases.

1.4 CONTEXT

After a couple of decades of gradual liberalisation, civic and democratic space in Tanzania is currently shrinking. Under the impression of increasing electoral competition, governments controlled by the ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), in power in various guises since independence in 1961, have embarked on a process in which the state is again envisaged to play a greater role in the development of the country. The change was underway already under the previous administration (2011-15) but has been accelerated after the 2015 elections. It touches upon all spheres of life and has implications for the activities of civil society organisations too. Whereas civic space gradually opened up after the re-introduction of multiparty elections in 1994-95, organisations now have to thread more carefully. Twaweza, too, has faced consequences when its activities were perceived to be too political. Combined, these trends provide for a more challenging context for civil society organisations to operate in.

As can be observed from press Freedom according to Reporters Without Borders\(^\text{11}\) and freedom rating according to Freedom House\(^\text{12}\), Tanzania’s freedom ratings has deteriorated significantly over the Strategy period (Table 2). In the first rating from 75 out of 180 countries in 2015 dropping to 95 in 2018, in the second rating from 3,5 points in 2015 to 5 points in 2018, using a 7 scale rating (worst is 7).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Press freedom according to Reporters without borders</th>
<th>Freedom rating according to Freedom House (1 best/7 worst)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Reporters Without Borders</th>
<th>Freedom House</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>70/180</td>
<td>3/7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>69/180</td>
<td>3/7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>75/180</td>
<td>3.5/7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>71/180</td>
<td>3.5/7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>83/180</td>
<td>4/7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>93/180</td>
<td>5/7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^{11}\) [https://rsf.org/en/tanzania](https://rsf.org/en/tanzania)

\(^{12}\) [https://freedomhouse.org/country/tanzania](https://freedomhouse.org/country/tanzania)
The major changes in Tanzania’s development largely correlated with Twaweza’s Strategy 2015-18, even if their origin can be traced further back. In the late 2000s, CCM felt under increasing pressure from a series of grand corruption scandals and the perception that the revenues from the country’s resources benefitted foreign investors and a small group of Tanzanian individuals, not the country as a whole. Civil society organisations in particular pointed to deficiencies in the management of energy and natural resources and the opposition parties soon mobilised on this agenda. Following the historically competitive 2010 elections, CCM began a dual reform process. First, it reformed itself internally by more clearly separating ‘money and politics’. Secondly, a rethink on the economy began in which more emphasis was put on the state’s role in developing the economy. Initially this agenda was only implemented gradually. It accelerated after the 2015 elections in which the opposition made further inroads into traditional CCM strongholds, but also saw the election of CCM’s John Pombe Magufuli as President.

Magufuli hardened the approach towards the opposition and critical voices. Again, this had been underway already under his predecessor, under whose tenure laws on cybercrime, statistics and media were introduced prior to the 2015 elections that were widely seen as restricting freedom of speech. The activities of opposition parties were also suppressed through a number of measures. First, the TV live-coverage from Parliament was banned and in June 2016, an indefinite ban on public meetings, including party rallies, was announced, denying the opposition major platforms to reach out to new constituencies.

Civil society was also affected by restrictions. To some extent, liberalisation and the reintroduction of multi-party elections in Tanzania had happened due to pressure from development partners. Also within Tanzania and CCM itself there had been voices advocating for change. Under African Socialism, most independent organisations had systematically been incorporated into the party-state. The early indigenous CSOs and community development groups, that mushroomed over the years following multiparty elections, did not focus on political activities that could be perceived as challenging state control. However, during the 1990s, new organisations emerged and they gradually shifted the approach from service delivery towards an advocacy and good governance agenda with the goal of holding state authorities to account. The voices within CCM advocating for opening up civic space now appear to have been weakened.

In fact, liberalisation had only happened gradually, as CCM wished to maintain its control over the state. The deregistering of civil society organisations deemed too political has been retained as an option throughout the years. The decision to re-register NGOs in 2017 was

seen as a warning in this regard.\textsuperscript{18} In an international perspective, Tanzanian civil society organisations were rather weak and were often dominated by their international funders.\textsuperscript{19}

Less confrontational approaches have often proved successful, involving the knowledge and resources of foreign actors in different kinds of collaboration with government actors.\textsuperscript{20} However, involving foreign links and resources means walking a fine line between drawing on foreign resources on the one hand and avoiding being perceived as running errands for foreign powers on the other. Religious organisations with millions of members appear to be the exception to the rule with the government repeatedly stressing the importance of their support and collaboration.\textsuperscript{21}

Twaweza too has had to operate under these changing terms. Whereas its first strategic period (up till 2014) was marked by progress in terms of organisation and influence on public policy within education and Open Government\textsuperscript{22}, it has faced tougher times recently. As the production of evidence and data, the generation of debate, and the promotion of government responsiveness through citizen agency are at the core of its vision, mission and values, it has been operating in an increasingly difficult environment. The four bills introduced prior to the election in 2015 have continued to make their mark throughout the strategy period in various ways. Most significantly, the Statistics Act in various guises has influenced Twaweza’s ability to conduct and publish surveys. The Statistics Act of 2015 made it illegal to publish data not approved by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) as ‘official’.\textsuperscript{23} Questions about permits and the legality of Twaweza data have ensued. Twaweza’s publication of statistics showing declining support for the president in 2018 led the State’s Commission for Science and Technology (COSTECH) to threaten with legal measures because the survey had supposedly been conducted without a research clearance.\textsuperscript{24} Subsequently, the Tanzanian authorities have withheld the passport of Twaweza’s Executive Director, Aidan Eyakuze.\textsuperscript{25}

Further restrictions were introduced with the tabling of amendments to the Statistics Act towards the end of 2018, making the questioning of official data illegal.\textsuperscript{26} Another change that


\textsuperscript{24} Citizen, T. (2018). “Tanzania’s Twaweza in trouble as Costech claims recent survey was uncertified.” The Citizen 11 July 2018.


happened under the current administration was the government decision in 2017 to pull out of the Open Government Partnership (OGP) in which Twaweza had been a major advocate and partner. The work related to OGP had also been a major component in Twaweza’s current strategy.\textsuperscript{27} Under OGP the previous administration had committed to improving access to information through new legislation as well as through increased transparency and the publication of data. With the withdrawal, progress stalled and the creation of a mechanism to monitor implementation was not put in place as envisaged.\textsuperscript{28} Twaweza’s Kigoma Experiment with Open Government at the sub-national level, carried out in an opposition stronghold, also faced challenges as the government sought to block its implementation.\textsuperscript{29} Combined, these trends have led Twaweza onto a process of revisiting assumptions and approaches.\textsuperscript{30}


2 Findings

Findings take point of departure in the evaluation criteria, starting with Relevance followed by Effectiveness, Efficiency, Sustainability and Impact. For each of the criterion we have addressed the evaluation questions and indicators presented in the evaluation matrix (see Inception Report, Annex 3). For each of the criterion a brief introduction guides the reader on the structure of the section. Additional issues have emerged during the course of the evaluation process and have been addressed, such as the overall analytic approach to define the Strategy.

2.1 RELEVANCE

The relevance criterion primarily focuses upon the relevance of the overall theory of change of the Strategy against the theories of change of four major interventions, i.e. KiuFunza, Sauti za Wananchi, the 2015 Election and the Kigoma public agency experiment. We have assessed to which extent the latter theories have been relevant in achieving the intended effect (outcomes). This has included an analysis of the logic of the interventions, the built-in assumptions of the pathways followed and changes, if any, made during the implementation of the interventions. The detailed assessments of the four cases are presented in the Annex part of the evaluation report. See chapter 5 in Annex report.

In addition we have briefly assessed to which extent the overall analytic approach to the Strategy has been relevant. The review of the new strategy for 2019-2022 has been integrated in the 3.2. Lessons Learned section.

2.1.1 Design of the Strategy

The nine problem areas identified in the Strategy derived from a ‘problem-driven political economy analysis approach’ called Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA). The method is developed by Harvard University, Center for International Development. Twaweza’s application of the PDIA is briefly described in the Strategy. The exact manner in which data have been collected is not presented, only that Twaweza selected the most ‘meaningful’ problems. This indicates that key problems in basic education and Open Government have been defined by Twaweza and hypotheses developed for testing. In the same vein, in its high profile KiuFunza project Twaweza chose randomised control trials focusing on payment for performance as one of its key methodologies to address the problem of teacher motivation.

Whereas these are a fully legitimate approaches to identify issues and problems within education and government, it could be argued that the main problems have been defined by the researchers’ presupposed perception of the problems (Twaweza) and, to some extent, their solutions, which may not coincide with local citizens’ and public officials’ perception of what are the real problems and concerns in education government.

Early on, Twaweza could have considered applying additional and different analytic approaches that may have identified other core problems and concerns in education and government than those identified and which subsequently became the foundation for the Strategy.\textsuperscript{32} By triangulating results from different analytic approaches towards education and government, Twaweza could have identified different problem areas. While the problems identified by Twaweza most likely constitute existing problems in the education and government field they may not necessarily reflect the perceived concerns of the citizens and public officials.

As mentioned in the limitation section it was a challenge to address the assessment tools for the evaluation because Twaweza’s reporting includes a wide range of ‘measurement indicators’. The significant number of sub-goals under each problem areas also meant that some activities are reported more than once under different guises. The mere number of benchmarks is far too many. Some benchmarks also resemble activities or outputs.

2.1.2 Data on service delivery

Another aspect of relevance is that of ‘service delivery’. While evidence and data on service delivery formed a central component of the previous strategy, it appears to have become of less importance during the strategy period 2015–2018. Yet, evidence and data were still occupying an important part of activities, including its clear focus on basic education (Uwezo), and research and debates/dialogues related to water and health.

Service delivery (‘social goods’) stands out as the most important need/demand from citizens when deciding upon whom to vote for (measured against for example, religion, ethnicity, party, etc.). As demonstrated in Twaweza’s experience with the education sector, delivering data and data packages on service delivery can play a role in entering into constructive collaboration with government entities, opening up crevices in otherwise impassable systems, also under challenging socio-political contexts. While acknowledging that Twaweza has had a relatively strong profile on ‘service delivery data’ in the Strategy period it could have had played a greater role as a stronger entry point towards challenging unresponsiveness of government officials.

2.1.3 Donor and government policies

‘Good governance’ is the key word to donors in their support to Twaweza. Danida’s Country Programme for Tanzania 2015–2019 has as one of its three thematic areas ‘Governance and Rights’. Sida’s Tanzania 2013–2019 strategy,\textsuperscript{34} has guided the Embassy’s policies. The Twaweza Strategy is in line with Sida’s Strategy Result Area 2, Item 1 on ‘greater number of girls and boys who acquire basic knowledge and skills in schools’ and Result Area 3, Item 2 on ‘enhanced capacity in civil society to demand accountability and increased awareness of human rights’. DfID’s focus in Tanzania is on children, women and girls aiming at improving ‘the quality

\textsuperscript{32} A possible alternative and very interesting approach could have been Classic Grounded Theory. See Barney G. Glaser: \textit{ Emergence vs Forcing: Basics in Grounded Theory Analysis}, Sociology Press, 1992.


of their education’ and generally ‘build institutions’, support ‘building capacity of the government to deliver services such as health and education’ and work through civil society.\textsuperscript{35} As for the two minor funders, Wellspring\textsuperscript{36} has a key focus on developing innovative solutions to development and Hewlett\textsuperscript{37}, a private charitable foundation, supports the advancement of ideas and institutions to promote a better world.

Vision 2025, the Africa Union Continental Education Strategy for Africa (2025), the 2063 Agenda, and the new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs 2030) guide Tanzania’s overall development agenda. The Education Policy of 2014 aims to have well educated and skillful Tanzanians capable of contributing to the national development agenda and sustaining global competition. As such, the policy seeks to have education and training standards acceptable regionally and globally. The policy states that the government will work in collaboration with stakeholders in the education sector to strengthen quality control and assurance at all levels. The policy states that education in public schools will be free of charge for the initial eleven years. Twaweza’s interventions in education, for example Kiu-Funza and curriculum review, seek to achieve improved learning outcomes through improved school management and supervision of primary education. This is well in line with the country’s 2014 Education Policy.

Registration and operations of NGOs in Tanzania are in principle governed by the Non-Governmental Organizations Act of 2002 and the NGOs Policy of 2001. The overall objective of the NGOs Policy is to create an enabling environment for the NGOs to operate effectively and efficiently in the social and economic transformation of the country. The policy states clearly that ‘the Government recognizes the signification role and contributions of NGOs in the society and considers them as important partners in the development process. It is, therefore, in the interest of the government to create a conducive and enabling environment to ensure that NGOs potentials are fully utilized’. It states further that it intends ‘to facilitate exchange of information and regular dialogue among all parties involved in or with NGOs in Tanzania’.

In addition, the Government of Tanzania is implementing the UNDP Tanzania’s Governance Programme 2016–2021. The programme goal is to achieve effective, transparent, accountable and inclusive governance, in line with the principal objectives set out in the Tanzania Development Vision 2025 and Zanzibar Vision 2020, which include peace, stability, unity and good governance.

The NGOs Act and Policy are generally supportive of Twaweza’s operations in the country. But several enacted laws introduced prior to as well as during the Strategy period have led to declining civil space and created restrictions on operations of NGOs in the country. This has to a large extent compromised the impact of Twaweza programme on Open Government as described in this report.

\textsuperscript{36} https://www.wellspring.com
\textsuperscript{37} https://hewlett.org
2.1.4 Relevance analysis of 4 major interventions

Twaweza drafted cases of four major interventions in an effort to evaluate to which extent these interventions have had relevance to the overall theory of change of the Strategy. The cases contained a retroactive description of the intervention’s theory of changes as well as the development and results of the intervention. The structure of the analysis followed a basic four-step approach: First, the theory of change for the individual intervention is described based on the case information. Then, the processes and results as well as the lessons learned from the intervention is summarised, and thereafter the intervention is discussed and assessed. The final analysis relates of the interventions to the overall theory of change. The detailed analyses of the four interventions have been structured in a ‘box’ format and are presented in Annex 5. Below is presented a summary of the result of the analysis.

The four major interventions analysed are

(i) Sauti za Wananchi (SzW), a mobile phone survey platform
(ii) KiuFunza, a teacher payment for performance research project
(iii) the Kigoma Ujiji local government intervention, coming out of the national and global Open Government Partnership, piloting local transparency and accountability
(iv) the Election 2015, linked to case studies of public agency demonstrating responsive government and/or active citizenship.

They cover a range of Twaweza’s problem areas in the 2015-2018 Strategy period. The four major interventions all fall within Twaweza’s overall change theory, but the degree to which they refer to, reflect upon and feed back into the theory differs.

(i) Sauti za Wananchi (SzW)
A mini theory of change related to SzW suggests that SzW ‘fills a data gap’ by making regular information about citizens’ experiences and opinions available to media, government, civil society organisations and academics, as well as the general public’ (Twaweza 2019). By providing a reliable mechanism for measuring citizens’ perceptions, SzW aims at increasing national public servants’ and politicians’ willingness and ability to take citizen voices into account. This is also expected to foster their positive attitude towards data.

The mini theory of change largely corresponds with the hypotheses and metrics for the problem area O3 in Twaweza Strategy 2015-18 (p. 43), which has the lack of independent monitoring of key services and sectors, as well as sources of citizens’ perceptions on these as its point of departure. The provision of such data is expected to inform public debate, be referred to by ministries and ultimately lead to policies and practices that better reflects these perceptions of the public. From this perspective the mini theory of change is relevant.

Until it came to a halt by mid-2018 SzW produced data that has been relevant to the overall theory of change through a combination of public launches that have influenced public debate as well as through direct outreach to decision-makers. However, the shrinking civic space in Tanzania also affected the operation of SzW. Already in 2015 uncertainty related to the legality of SzW was reported in relation to the Statistics Act. In 2017 it is noted that the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) reviews questions and in 2018 the publication of data on the president’s popularity led to further restrictions, which means that no new data has been launched since then.

It is concluded that SwZ has been a critical and highly relevant mechanism that has provided significant ‘evidence’ and through the media and public officials influenced public debates.
(ii) KiuFunza
A mini theory of change related to KiuFunza outlines seven specific, steps ‘for the incentives to improve measured learning’ (Twaweza 2019). The seven steps go from communicating an incentive offer to teachers and ensuring their acceptance and that they find it attractive over their ability to improve learning outcomes to tests and payments implemented and teachers are paid in time along with school level feedback (Twaweza 2019).

A clearer link to Twaweza’s overall theory of change can be deducted from the Twaweza Strategy 2015-18 (p. 46), which outlines the hypotheses and key metrics for the problem area E3, under which KiuFunza falls. It states that ‘Teachers are not sufficiently motivated, supported and held accountable to ensure children learn’. It hypothesises that a second phase of KiuFunza will generate evidence on how teacher incentives can improve learning, which is expected to generate public attention and debate and help purvey the idea of ‘teacher payment based on delivered, measured learning outcomes’38. This in turn is expected to generate public as well as technical debates, which will convince primarily the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Regional and Local Government to pilot the approach and include it in a new education policy.

The mini theory is thus a narrowly reflection of the larger theory of change. This also provides for a somewhat restricted approach to demotivated teachers compared to other factors that may undermine teacher motivation. Overall lack of funding, arrears in payment and poor working conditions point to these factors, as well as the ‘critical friends’.39 KiuFunza I and II produced evidence, the latter showing improved student learning equivalent to an additional one-third of a year of schooling. Key decision-makers were subsequently encouraged by Twaweza to engage with findings, culminating in the 2017 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Ministry of Regional and Local Government and Ministry of Education and their commitment to take part in KiuFunza III.

It is concluded that the implementation of KiuFunza as demonstrated in the mini theory of change focuses on the output level, reflecting narrowly the strategy theory of change. Twaweza increasingly seeks to involve relevant authorities and the approach is thus relevant, but less generated through public debate as hypothesised than through direct engagement with government stakeholders.

(iii) Kigoma-Ujiji local government intervention
A mini theory of change related to the Kigoma-Ujiji local government intervention outlines how the commitment by the council to make data on budgets, services, etc., available to the public would lead to ‘greater demand for accountability and awareness of the responsive posture of the municipality’. New platforms for citizen voices as well as monitoring by civil society were furthermore expected to influence local plans.

The Kigoma-Ujiji intervention and mini theory of change fall under the Twaweza Strategy 2015-18’s problem area O1 on Open Government, which focus on the lack of legislative basis and mechanisms for the right to information. The intervention – at times also mentioned as a ‘sub-national pilot’ - can be seen as coming out of the second part of O1’s hypothesis, namely that the analysis of obstacles to effective mechanisms for the operationalization of access to information legislation can be used to advocate for change.40 It also relates to the O2 problem area.

38 Strategy 2015-18, p. 46
39 See for instance World Bank (2014); HakiElimu (2016); see also https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/06/08/2018/open-letter-fifteen-leading-development-economists
on poor government data, which has the availability and meaningfulness of data at district level as a key metrics.

It is concluded that the Kigoma Ujiji intervention is relevant to Twaweza’s overall theory of change.

(iv) The Elections 2015
The mini theory of change related to the Elections 2015 had as its point of departure the wish to focus on the substance of politics by providing a platform for candidates to present their policies and priorities in more detail. The airing of these was in turn expected to make citizens’ voting better informed. The election activities were followed by a ten-months campaign on holding representatives accountable. The experiences from the election activities also informed Twaweza’s design of TV and radio talk shows to be broadcasted later in the strategy period.

The Elections 2015 activities are primarily reported under the Twaweza Strategy’s problem area O5 under Open Government, which aims at creating opportunities and documenting positive examples of public agency and responsiveness by the government. This in turn was expected to help develop a positive public narrative that that responsive governance is possible. From this perspective the election activities are relevant.

It is concluded that the election intervention has had obvious and clear relevance to the overall theory of change with a focus on active citizens and accountable politicians. The relevance however may have been clearer and have provided a better effect overall if the theory of the election event had been more coherent, linking better the aim and expected results, i.e. focus on addressing substantive issues and policy position. The latter was not addressed satisfactorily as most of the debates eventually turned out to be superficial.

2.2 EFFECTIVENESS

The Effectiveness section describes, assesses and concludes on each of the nine problem areas and their respective success criteria. The description of the development of the nine problems over the Strategy period is very detailed, and is therefore presented in Annex 6. It shows the comprehensiveness of the activity level of Twaweza as well as providing a solid ground for assessing the results within the theory of change setting.

In Section (2.2.2) the detailed assessment has been summarised for each of the Open Government and basic education problem areas.

2.2.1 Benchmark acivement assessment

The ToR also asked the evaluation to assess the degree of benchmark achievements. Table 3 includes aggregated data based on Annex 7.

For 2015, 36 out of 62 benchmarks were achieved, or 62.6%. In 2016, 36 out of 68 benchmarks were achieved, or 53%. In 2017, 36 out of 60 benchmarks were achieved, or 60%. As such we can conclude benchmarks achieved over the 2015-2017 period lies at an average percentage of 58,5%. Looking at only ‘What Works’ benchmarks for both domains the score is, for the three years, 38%. This cannot but be viewed as unsatisfactory, even considering the restrictiveness of the civic space. With that framework in mind we consider the overall achievement level, 58,5%, only somewhat satisfactory, yet overall in line with what can be expected partly from the restrictive nature of the political environment and partly from Twaweza not being sufficiently able to follow-up and build strengths at the output and intermediate outcome levels. The follow-up issue is discussed in later sections of the report.
Table 3. Benchmarks achieved for Tanzania

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme Area</th>
<th>2015 Number of benchmarks achieved</th>
<th>2016 Number of benchmarks achieved</th>
<th>2017 Number of benchmarks achieved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Data and voice</td>
<td>3 out of 4 achieved</td>
<td>2 out of 3 achieved</td>
<td>1 out of 2 achieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uwezo</td>
<td>6 out of 9 achieved</td>
<td>4 out of 9 achieved</td>
<td>5 out of 6 achieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What Works in Basic Education</td>
<td>3 out of 6 achieved</td>
<td>2 out of 8 achieved</td>
<td>4 out of 6 achieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What Works in Open Government</td>
<td>3 out of 8 achieved</td>
<td>5 out of 12 achieved</td>
<td>5 out of 11 achieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public and Policy Engagement</td>
<td>4 out of 9 achieved</td>
<td>5 out of 9 achieved</td>
<td>4 out of 8 achieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engagement</td>
<td>2 out of 6 achieved</td>
<td>4 out of 6 achieved</td>
<td>1 out of 6 achieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring</td>
<td>3 out of 6 achieved</td>
<td>2 out of 5 achieved</td>
<td>4 out of 6 achieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td>1 out of 1 achieved</td>
<td>2 out of 3 achieved</td>
<td>1 out of 3 achieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learning activities</td>
<td>1 out of 2 achieved</td>
<td>3 out of 3 achieved</td>
<td>3 out of 3 achieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>2 out of 2 achieved</td>
<td>1 out of 2 achieved</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting</td>
<td>3 out of 3 achieved</td>
<td>3 out of 3 achieved</td>
<td>3 out of 3 achieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Resources &amp; Financial management</td>
<td>5 out of 6 achieved</td>
<td>3 out of 5 achieved</td>
<td>5 out of 5 achieved</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Twaweza Strategy 2015-2018, Data received from Twaweza management.

2.2.2 Open Government effectiveness assessment

O1: The overall aim of O1 was to secure right to information through appropriate legislations. The core goal of getting an Access to Information Act passed by the Parliament was achieved in 2016 and in a better shape than initially feared from the bill presented in 2015, facilitated by Twaweza and a wider coalition of civil society organisations and probably the government’s commitment linked to donor funding. Early evidence indicates that the public has had limited access to information and no follow-up assessment has been carried out to assess development.

The government’s decision to withdraw from the Open Government Partnership in mid-2017 significantly affected Twaweza’s work in the area of Open Government. It intensified its engagement in public debates commenting on the government in a ‘push back’ against misinformation and a shrinking civic space and involved activities towards coalition building, combined with media activities and the continuation of activities at the sub-national level (Kigoma and public agency). In 2018, engagement in selected strategic litigation in court to challenge the shrinking space became pronounced.

While Twaweza demonstrated an ability to adapt to the changing political context it did not rephrase its problems under the Open Government domain to make them less ambitious as things turned for the worse in 2017. In the Annual Report for 2017 it is mentioned that a rephrasing of the problems in the Open Government domain had been considered, but that it was decided not
to ‘tinker with the phrasing’ (p. 5). The process became more pronounced as evidenced in the Ideas and Evidence event in March 2018 that helped inform the new Strategy 2019-22.\textsuperscript{41}

O2: The aim of O2 was to improve the quality and integrity of data collected by government and its publication in a ‘timely, systematic and meaningful fashion’. Twaweza splits this undertaking into two: the publication of its own data and of the government’s open data work. In terms of the former, SzW and Uwezo continued to be important data collection tools; surveys were undertaken and websites developed and there is anecdotal evidence in 2016 and 2017 that the websites were being used. The influence on the quality and publication of government data is less clear. Progress seems linked to the Tanzanian government’s previous commitment related to a World Bank credit linked to Open Government that year as much as to Twaweza’s activities. The release of government data comes to a halt after the government withdrew from the OGP in 2017 and Twaweza does not report upon it in the second half of the period.

Overall, the work with media and other outreach activities became more pronounced over the period and a significant and growing number of activities targeting the public, through the media, as well as outreach to selected target groups, can be observed over the period. There is evidence that the media is using Twaweza data, but this does not seem to have caused the expected increase in official government support to data availability and use.

O3: The purpose of O3 was to address the lack of transparent and robust independent information monitoring on the status of key services and sectors and to provide insights into the opinions of citizens on these. The activity with regard to polls using SzW remains high until July 2018 when the legality of this type of surveys was questioned by government. Media coverage and social media attention during the Strategy period also remains high even in a country where public debate is still restricted. Surveys on service delivery was carried out in 2015 and 2016. It is not reported upon in 2017 and 2018, but there are still some surveys activities on service delivery even if there is some shift of focus towards using SzW for advocacy purposes. Some uptake on service delivery among authorities and policy-makers can be observed through their willingness to participate in public launch events. At the end of the period Twaweza engaged in scaling up data delivery of some service delivery related activities, including in water quality.

O4: The overall goal of O4 was to increase the number and capacity of intermediaries who can demand and use data from the government. The focus was on encouraging journalists, local government officials as well as other actors’ use of ‘packaged’ data. The entering of partnerships with more media and NGOs and research organisations suggest that there was some progress in this regard but no credible evidence established since there was no baseline and indicators reported. Twaweza pursued an ad hoc and relatively low-key approach to addressing the problem. As in other problem areas, Twaweza lacks in following-up on activities undertaken and strategically connect these to the Strategy theory.

O5: The overall purpose of problem area O5 was to make government more responsive through the identification of stories of public agency and creating opportunities for dialogue. Addressing the problem seems to have been challenging, partly due to the changing socio-political context. Most activities seem to have been related to the media, first by the organisation of debates during the 2015 elections, and secondly related to TV talk shows over the period. Whereas there were concerted attempts to bring citizens and politicians together during these media activities,
the effect is not reported upon apart from numbers on coverage. Therefore it is difficult to assess overall effect.

**Summary:** Activity, output and outreach levels have been high in almost all Open Government sub-problem areas. Data and data ‘packages’ produced by Twaweza, particularly through SzW and Uwezo, have been important tools in establishing evidence based information to target groups, whether government officials, MPs or through various media outlets. However, lack of follow-up on many of the activities undertaken have to a large extent reduced the ability of Twaweza to link these activities appropriately with the Strategy theory, as the many examples provided in Annex 6 show. Table 4 shows examples of lack of follow-up from the two main domains and the LME.

Whereas the shrinking of the civic space that gained momentum during the Strategy period clearly explains some of the barriers to execute activities, Twaweza may have had more room for manoeuvring if (i) the ambitious goal were revised following Tanzania’s departure from the OGP, and (ii) results of activities were followed-up upon forming new or revised pathways for goal achievements.

**Table 4. Examples of lack of follow-up to activities undertaken**

| From the O3 problem area: | The production of the mobile phone panel survey handbook was [link](http://hdl.handle.net/10986/24595) launched during the 2016 Open Government Partnership Summit in Paris. What has happened since? Has it been distributed? To who? Has it been used? Any feedback? What has been the result of this work? |
| From the O4 problem area: | In addressing the theory of change one would have expected a follow-up to the scoping study on local government officials’ awareness of data on the opendata.go.tz portal. For example (i) to investigate how many of the 40% of the local government officials actually used the data in their daily work from the open data portal to improve their performance and lobby for improved services – and (ii) to investigate how to strengthen outreach to those 60% of local officials that were not aware the open data portal. |
| Also, it could have been useful to know to which extent the Wajibu Institute’s simplified auditing formats were used by local government officials, and likewise, to which extent the result of the Wajibu conference on accountability for local government was followed-up upon. What was learned and what could this learning be used for to facilitate local government engagement in accountability? |
| From the O5 problem area: | Regarding the partners trained in 2017 on the use of a data application: was it useful, did the partners manage to apply their skills in their work places? What was the result of the teacher monitoring in 40 schools? Did data provide new insights that can be used for bringing teacher performance forward? |
| From the E1 problem area: | To which extent was the online launch of Uwezo data in 2017 used by the 150 MPs, government officials, and other stakeholders? And how were the 159 district reports received and reflected upon by district stakeholders? And did the content bring insights into furthering improved and sustained performance of the teachers and the school system, etc.? |
| From the E4 problem area: | In 2016 and 2017, a pilot on a larger scale was carried out as a randomized control trial in Bukoba district, resulted in findings that suggested that school leadership is important, not least that the head teacher is ‘motivated, determined and resourceful’ (AR 2017). What follow-up activities were initiated based on such important information? |
2.2.3 Basic Education effectiveness assessment

The overall problem of Twaweza’s work on basic education is that schooling does not lead to learning. The four problem areas, their sub-goals and activities all relate to this in various ways.

**E1**: The goal of E1 is to ensure that schooling leads to learning. Annual Uwezo assessments are hypothesised to promote evidence-based decision-making and thus facilitate learning. A paper published in 2015 summarising a number of studies on the effect of Uwezo suggests that there was evidence that Uwezo had contributed to a shift in public debate from providing infrastructure and increasing enrolment to learning already in the previous strategy period. Uwezo contributed to opholding this shift in the evaluated 2015-18 Strategy Period. The level of activity remained high throughout the period, outreach activities seem to have increased and the launch of data generated significant public debate. Data was also used to make inroads into policy circles. Despite at times strained relations with the Ministry of Education due to the publication of critical data, it got involved in a government task force, contributed to a new Education Act together with other NGOs and its data was cited widely, in, for example, the Joint Sector Review, the 2018 World Development Report, as well as in other publications.

Outreach activities were expanded and included talk shows and online debates and presentations of district level data had reached almost two-thirds of all districts in Tanzania by the end of 2018 generating local debate and engagement. As related to the theory of change, Twaweza seems to be more activity focused and less on feeding back into its own work in a programmatic manner.

**E2**: The E2 problem area aims to collect evidence on the curriculum and make it more realistic in order to promote learning. The problem area got a head start with the development of a methodology to analyse curricula involving experts and a key government official. Uwezo was also invited to participate in a national curriculum review process. Research took off for real in 2016 and preliminary findings indicated that the problem was less of an overambitious curriculum than too much focus on recall learning. As a result, some readjustment of focus took place and there was a delay in finalization of analyses, papers and reports, as well as outreach activities. Apart from being part of setting an agenda and initiating debate, and through its research revealed a change in the perception of the problem area (being an issue of recall learning and not an overambitious curriculum), achievements are difficult to assess.

**E3**: The aim of the E3 problem area is to generate evidence to support pay for performance in education and convince the relevant ministries that it should be piloted and included in a new education policy. It is a rather specific approach centred on the KiuFunza research trials with a second phase implemented and a third phase designed and prepared in the strategy period. Results demonstrated the effect of paying teachers and schools extra for performance, resulting in significantly improved learning. Much was done to engage key decision makers in the Ministry of
Education and Ministry of Regional and Local Government in the findings. This led to the signing of a MOU for a new trial in 2017. Implementation was delayed and took off in 2019 facilitated and funded by Twaweza, but with ministries allocating staff to monitor the implementation. Findings were also disseminated at national and international conferences. Impact in terms of policy change and learning outcomes is yet to happen.

E4: The aim of the E4 problem area is to shed light on and strengthening school management and parents’ participation in order to improve child learning. The activities in this area largely consist of research activities aimed at gathering evidence. Some of these activities are longterm in nature, and since they took off in the Strategy period they have not yielded major outputs. There were significant delays to a Positive Deviance (PD) study, which had been expected to deliver more immediate results. No permission has been given to carry out the final stage of the research, and the activity had a difficult start as the PD approach was new to Twaweza and experts to practically adopt the approach not easy to find. There is significant under-spending and evidence on progress in addressing hypotheses and metrics is limited.

Summary: As was the case with the Open Government problem areas, activity, output and outreach levels have been high, in particularly Uwezo and KiuFunza and less in curriculum development and school management. Data and data ‘packages’ produced by Twaweza, particularly through Uwezo, have been important tools in establishing evidence based information to target groups, whether government officials, MPs or through various media outlets and intermediate levels of achievements have been reached. Also, as was the case for the Open Government domain, lack of follow-up on relevant activities undertaken has to a large extent reduced the ability of Twaweza to link these activities appropriately with the Strategy theory – though not to the same degree as for the Open Government domain.

2.2.4 Effectiveness assessment of Learning, Monitoring and Evaluation

The Learning, Monitoring and Evaluation component was established for Twaweza to ‘learn’ by asking questions about ‘what works’ in the two domains of the Strategy, basic education and Open Government. As stated in the Strategy: 'Twaweza’s learning architecture seeks to cultivate a culture of critical enquiry, reflection and adaptation within the initiative'.

LME 1: Focus of LME 1 was on three issues: 1. Monitor quality, reach and coverage, 2. Receive feedback from target groups, and 3. Apply quantitative and qualitative methods in monitoring processes. Over the Strategy period significant increase in monitoring activities occurred and the overall approach of ‘reach, coverage and quality’ assessment was applied consistently for some monitoring activities, including media coverage. Monitoring and feedback methods took a great variety of forms, including media coverage. Monitoring and feedback methods took a great variety of forms, including surveys, interviews/outcome mapping, baseline studies, and structures for assessing quantitative data. However, it has been neither clear nor evident that the results of the monitoring activities have influenced the strategy theory of change of the two domains. Also, it appears that no monitoring strategy was defined. It could appear somewhat arbitrary which activities were subject to monitoring.

LME 2: Numerous activities have taken place over the strategy period showing the dedication of Twaweza to address and strengthen learning through evaluation activities, including the drafting of an evaluation strategy as well as the establishment of the Research and Evaluation Advisory Group (REAG), both institutionalizing evaluation for learning. Also, the evaluations and research activities show thoroughness in the methodologies applied (for example in the Uwezo volunteers

analysis and the teacher payment study) and important and strong evidence based results came from the work.

While activity levels have been high there is no systematic effort made to assess how the evaluations influence the higher-level theory. What is observed is that one research effort and its result leads to more insight and development of new research efforts and results, but no clear link is made to see how these results influence the theory.

LME 3: Twaweza sees itself as a learning organisation with a learning agenda embedded in all internal and external activities. This requires staff that are encouraged and receptive to a learning culture, innovation and ideas. Numerous and varied activities were undertaken in this learning component and their mere volume has without doubt contributed to learning and skills development of Twaweza staff. Yet, evidence lacks on how staff has applied the learning in their daily work and how this may have furthered the strategy theory of change. The team did not have access to staff performance data but anecdotal evidence confirms that staff have gained significant skills and knowledge improvements.

Summary: The LME component has been successful in many respects by undertaking numerous monitoring and evaluation activities for learning purposes, helping foster a culture of learning within Twaweza. Main concerns relate to the lack of systematic and prioritised follow-up to activities that could have facilitated improved monitoring and evaluation at outcome levels. As such the LME's efforts to become an integral part in furthering the theory of change has only been somewhat successful.

2.2.5 ‘Scaled up’ projects

Some initiated activities during the Strategy period were defined as scaled up by Twaweza. These included the #MbungeLive, the support to the Christian Social Service Commission, CSSC (while actually changed from a national support to a district focused support), the roll out of SzW on localised levels, in Dar es Salaam in 2017, and the expansion on data collection for the SDGs. Also, based on the increasing reach through on-line media JamiiForums, in 2018, Twaweza looked at alternative and additive platforms, including KwanzaTV, a new independent online TV station, and working with a group of individuals with high levels of influence on social media. Twaweza’s own description of these ‘scaled up’ projects are described in more details in Annex 8.

While Twaweza describe the activities mentioned as ‘scaled-up’ projects it is not clear to which extent that they are viewed within the context of the change theory as there is no clear reference to the theory and how the scaling up described contributes to achieving outcome levels.

2.3 EFFICIENCY

Value for Money (VfM) refers to the optimal use of resources to achieve planned outcomes and impacts. It relates to the expected or realized outcomes and impacts to the costs incurred to deliver them. The evaluation of VfM can be done in several ways depending on the purpose and context. For example, DFID has developed a VfM approach, which emphasizes that the impact of a project on improvement of the lives of poor people is maximized with respect to the resources spent on it.

The assessment of VfM adopts the DFID approach to analyse the economy and efficiency of the activities and outputs of Twaweza during the implementation of its 2015-2018 Strategy. The VfM effectiveness part has been thoroughly addressed in the Effectiveness section of this report. The efficiency analysis has been limited to the extent that data has been available. As such no comprehensive analysis has been undertaken.
2.3.1 Assessment of ‘economy’ and ‘efficiency’ at Twaweza

Assessment of economy in a project undertaking looks at relative costs of the project to determine the extent to which inputs have been procured at low costs. On the other side, assessment of efficiency refers to how well the outputs have been achieved. Included in efficiency assessment are dimensions of quantity, quality, time and cost.

Twaweza spent about 75% of its planned budget for the implementation of the Strategy. During the period the recruitment and procurement processes at Twaweza remained competitive. Twaweza has a procurement policy that guides all procurement of goods and services; exceptional cases have to be justified and approved as per the set procedures. The policy ensures that there is VfM for procured goods and services through open competitive bidding system for all procuring units at Twaweza.

Twaweza has used both direct and indirect methods of staff recruitment. The direct method did not work well in order to employ competent staff; instead, competitive approach by advertising job vacancies in newspapers, website, and also by the use of recruitment agents are now being used, assessed by Twaweza itself to be more efficient. Other arrangements including internship programmes where potential candidates are retained, subject to availability of vacancies, are also used in staff recruitment. These approaches ensure that Twaweza gets better and more competent personnel in delivering its activities.

During the period Twaweza installed a video-conferencing system in all the three country offices. In-door training is provided through the video system including the running of staff meetings with all staff across the three countries. This has worked well and brought country staff ‘closer’ to each other. The system is used on a daily basis for a variety of huddles, senior management team meetings, recruitment, team and bilateral meetings which has reduced travel expenses and made Twaweza efficient in its management activities (AR 2017).

Financial management systems have included significant automation introducing, for example, a successful cashless system. Overall, the management system is operating very efficient and further strengthened through introduction of applicable technology. Easy access to data and Twaweza information is however problematic when opening its website. Its search machine is highly inadequate not answering satisfactorily to simple search criteria.

To assess the relative costs of the implementation of the Strategy activities, we have analysed the cost of the biggest input, namely Twaweza’s human resource, which consist of 41% of the costs – and compared with two like-minded institutions working in Tanzania. The two NGOs have been included in the analysis anonymously in order to abide to confidentiality of the information they have accepted to share. The analysis is intended to give a wide picture of the relative local costs of Twaweza with a caveat that Twaweza is a regional organisation.

Table 5 shows the total number of employees by their level of education in the three organisations. The data, including the classification by cadres of employees, have been provided by the respective organisations. They resemble each other closely with regard to the total number of staff employed. However the other two institutions have a big number of relatively more trained (by level of education) personnel than Twaweza.

Table 5. Total Number of Employees by their Level of Education in Three Like-minded NGOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Number of Employees by their Level of Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Institution One</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of top cadre employees</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6 depicts a comparative analysis of the average monthly salaries of the different cadres by the three institutions expressed in ratio (taken Institution 1 top management level as ratio 1). The analysis of the salary does not indicate major deviance in the salary scale for medium cadre employees in the three institutions. However, on average Twaweza pays relatively more for all cadres of employees. In particular, the top cadres (directors and managers) are paid almost twice as much as institution 2, and more than twice the average salary of institution 1.

### Table 6: Comparative Analysis of Salary Incentives for three like-minded NGOs (ratio-based)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected Institutions</th>
<th>Employees by Cadres and Average Monthly Salary (ratio-based)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Top Cadre employees (Top management)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institution 1</td>
<td>(1,00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institution 2</td>
<td>(1,25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TWAWEZA</td>
<td>(2,42)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We have not addressed productivity among the three institutions, but from the data available Twaweza pays relatively higher for the top cadre than the other two like-minded organisations – suggesting that Twaweza costs are relatively higher, and its VfM is challenged further by reduced impact achievements. On the other hand several activities performed by Twaweza may to some extent justify a higher cost level, including Twaweza operating on a regional scale, strong support to partners and development of joint concepts for projects, and generally focus on development on human resources.

### 2.3.2 Assessment of partner relations

During the implementation of its 2015-2018 Strategic plan, Twaweza partnered with many development actors, including government and non-government, to accomplish its projects on enhancing Open Government and learning outcomes in basic education. 12 partners relating to Open Government and 8 for improving learning in basic education were interviewed and partner data sheets provided on key data for each of the partner mentioned. The partners represented a wide range of public, media, networking and NGOs. The two domains and the LME included the following partners:

### Table 7. Selected partners of Twaweza

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In Open Government</th>
<th>In Basic Education</th>
<th>LME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Code4Tanzania</td>
<td>• Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, President’s Office</td>
<td>• Learning Collaborative Research and Evaluation Advisory Group (REAG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Mwananchi Communica-tions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

43 This list of actual data received from Twaweza differs somewhat from the list presented in the Inception Report, but overall covers the main collaborating partners. We did not have data sheets from the LME organisations but interviewed representatives from REAG.
12 of the partners had engagement contracts with Twaweza, four had MoUs and three of them had membership engagement. As such, 16 out of the 20 partners engaged in the implementation of the Twaweza’s Strategy had formal contracts or MoUs. This indicates that a sufficient degree of efficiency has been applied in Twaweza’s relationship with its partners, as the MoUs state responsibilities and tasks as well as expected outputs and deliverables. As for the actual outputs delivered, see Effectiveness.

Some concerns raised by the Twaweza partners working in projects in the Open Government domain related to the efficiency of the implementation of the Strategy. Data from the 20 partner sheets and other sources indicate the following:

- It is increasing difficulty to engage government particularly when it comes to seeking permissions for undertaking data collection.
- Obstacles from the government side through administrative delays (e.g. research permissions), and, in the case of Kigoma, unwanted technocrats are removed and attempts made to remove the mayor.
- The environment for data journalism has changed significantly over the course of the partnership. There are new restrictions for which Mwananchi Media is continuing to push boundaries and work within the new restrictions.
- The capacity of some of the partners to effectively support Twaweza in project outreach, engagement and follow up was often limited. For example, local government ‘dumps’ information online that are hard to access/use.
- Many of the partners are concerned about the current political climate. They observe that people are expressing genuine fear for speaking up.
- A few Open Government partners expressed that method of work differs between civil society organisations and media houses causing occasional friction in project implementation.

These findings reveal serious concerns as regard the development trend in the civic space. The environment for accessing, producing and distributing data have been squeezed, government data in the socio-economic area are continuously being of poor quality, harassment of ‘alternative ways’ to address Open Government by central government, and people expressing ‘genuine’ fear to speak up – all are obvious indicators for a significantly dwindled civic space in Tanzania. The consequences of this situation are presented in the sections on Lessons Learned and Conclusions.
2.4 SUSTAINABILITY

Sustainability is the extent to which benefits of the Strategy activities can continue or are likely to continue once Twaweza’s interventions have been completed. Or it may also look at the extent to which Twaweza can continue its operations following the departure of donor funding. The evaluation matrix addresses the first interpretation of ‘sustainability’ and asks about (i) Twaweza’s contribution to policy changes, including the number of improved policies and legislation enacted; (ii) Twaweza’s partners’ perception on benefits produced, their degree of sustainability. Regarding the first indicator, evidence has been provided in detail in the annual reports and summarised in 2.2.2.

Basic Education: Twaweza’s close work with the government in the education sector produced sustained benefits on the curriculum, the continuity of Uwezo data production, an MoU on Kiufunza, etc. The fact that government has been involved in the work process (e.g. through the Ministry of Education, Tanzania Institute of Education (TIE) and the the National Examinations Council of Tanzania (NECTA) from the early stages of the basic education component has catered for sustained results. Already at the very beginning of the strategy period, a paper summarising findings of past research on the first strategy period pointed to Uwezo data having contributed to changing the debate on education from focusing on providing infrastructure more towards learning.

Open Government: Twaweza contributed significantly, in collaboration with other civil society partners and facilitated by a World Bank investment funding, to the amendments made to an improved Access to Information Act in 2015 and 2016. While the legislative text/articles remain unchanged the generally increasing civic space restrictions have not permitted an effective implementation of the Act, as it is documented by Twaweza that 2 of 3 requests for information access at the local level was denied. One may reverse the argument and say that due to the government’s restrictiveness one request of three being successful is not a ‘bad deal’. These restrictions include the enactment of other civic restriction legislation, including the Media Services Act and the Statistics Act.

In comparison to the education problem area, efforts to develop sustained benefits in the Open Government domain have been less obvious due to the gradual civic space restrictiveness imposed by government causing Twaweza to a large extent to be reactive rather than proactive. The role of the government in achieving sustained results in development, even under difficult conditions, should however not be underestimated. Whereas Twaweza gradually developed a ‘push back’ approach to restrictions in civic space that included commenting on bills and advocacy activities, the organisation does not appear to systematically have been seeking other types of more institutionalised collaboration with the national government as its interest in the Open Government Partnership waned.

Overall, the solidity and reliability of Twaweza’s data production and knowledge sharing have over the years attracted public officials’ and MPs’ attention and a continuous demand for Twaweza produced data on service delivery is most likely. At the core of these activities are Uwezo and SzW, which were established in Twaweza’s first strategy period and continued during the 2015-18 period. It should however be noted that the intolerance or declining tolerance towards independently conducted surveys and opinion polls clearly represent a threat to the continuation and sustainability of especially SzW, as became evident from July 2018.

As for the second indicator Twaweza established numerous partnerships during the course of the strategy period. These partnerships are described and discussed in more detail in 2.3.2 Efficiency assessment. As regards any sustained benefits derived from the partnerships the following may be mentioned:
Twaweza facilitated the ‘birth’ of a new and independent organisation, the Wajibu Institute; a permanent data desk was established at Mwananchi Media; public agency results including construction of schools; capacity building, while often not formalised by Twaweza, has created skills and knowledge development that partners can use.

What have been less obviously sustained include Twaweza’s efforts to build monitoring skills among its partners to a sufficient degree. Also, 17 out 19 partners investigated claimed that their involvement in the Strategy will have or have produced sustained outcomes. While these claims are very optimistic they are also not sufficiently documented, and would require a more in-depth analysis for verification.

The institutionalisation of REAG and the strengthening of the LME unit (through staff expansion) are important indicators for a continuous and sustained learning culture in Twaweza beyond the strategy period.

2.5 IMPACT

The assessment of impact has been based on Twaweza’s aim to provide measurable impact by the end of 2018 on the following:

1. Children in school are learning as parents, teachers, school administrators and policy makers focus on measuring and improving the learning outcomes resulting from the large [social] investment in basic education.
2. Public authorities are responsive to public demand, and they promote and protect citizens’ right to high quality, relevant and meaningful information.
3. Citizens and civil society are asking for, getting and using information to improve their situation and engage public officials to deepen accountability and improve the quality of public service delivery.
4. Public and policy actors are using evidence-based knowledge to transforming governance practice and the provision of basic education.

While efforts have been made by Twaweza to achieve ambitious and measurable outcomes/goals, circumstances of repressiveness towards the civil space and Twaweza’s too activity-focused approach have contributed to impact not being achieved as planned. It was obviously a highly ambitious theory and strategy Twaweza entered into in 2015. Even before the setbacks in 2015 onwards, civic space was restricted in Tanzania. A precondition for achieving impact was the continued democratisation and expansion of civic space in Tanzania. This did not occur, and government restrictions increased. These factors also point to the fact that the government often play a bigger role than reflected in Twaweza’s theory. In 2017, as this became increasingly clear and as the Tanzanian government withdrew from the OGP, Twaweza discussed internally whether to reverse the Strategy and work on Open Government, but this did not happen.

The four areas of impacts constitute the outcome level of Twaweza’s theory. While its is concluded that impact has not been documented, we consider the results/benefits of the relevance, effectiveness and sustainability assessment as important building blocks upon which further work towards attaining impact can be based. We have listed those building blocks we find essential for furthering this process for each of the impacts in table 8.
Table 8. Building blocks for impact

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>Building blocks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Children in school are learning as parents, teachers, school</td>
<td>• Curriculum policy development effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>administrators and policy makers focus on measuring and improving the</td>
<td>• KiuFunza localised/pilot effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>learning outcomes in basic education</td>
<td>• Anecdotal evidence on parents-school relationship and contributions (Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deviance approach)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Government interest and collaboration on data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Public authorities responsive to public demand; promote/protect</td>
<td>• Access to Information Act basis for continuously addressing demands/requests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>citizens rights to info</td>
<td>(baseline: 2 of 3 requests for information at local level has been denied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>access)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Publication of data availability on eGovernment halted (in 2017); and talk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>shows and election data facilitate access to information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Analysis and comments on bills in collaboration with partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen/CS access and use info for improving their situation and</td>
<td>• Launching Uwezo data at district level from mid-2017 continued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>engage public officials to deepen accountability and improve public</td>
<td>• Kigoma ‘experiment’ challenge/engaging local officials (facilitated by strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>service delivery</td>
<td>CSO/Tamasha)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• At national plan collaboration with ministries on SDG metrics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Continued monitoring of service delivery and dissemination of results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public and policy actors use evidence-based knowledge to transform</td>
<td>• Overall interest to collaborate and make use of high quality data (SzW and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>government practices and the provision of basic education</td>
<td>Uwezo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Twaweza’s contribution on government collaboration/processes/procedures with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ministries, police (security), the judiciary, etc. is evident and to be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>continued</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

In Figure 2 we have assessed which elements of the theory of change have been most prevalent/dominant, at each level, during the Strategy period.

It shows that ‘evidence’ in the form of particularly data provided through SzW and Uwezo have been hugely instrumental at the output level. At the intermediate outcome level, the ‘public debate’ side of the theory has overwhelmingly dominated – during the election 2015, through TV and radio shows, and the Kigoma public agency experiment, as well as the initiation of debates in connection with media coverage.

Many goals/indicators of the SDGs are presented in the already collected data from Uwezo and Twaweza has as such already contributed to SDG data in education. However, steps have been taken during the strategy period to fill data gaps. Twaweza also has found particular traction in the issue of water quality and is expanding on SDG data collection in this area. Thus far, the use
of quick and easy water quality tests using volunteer researchers has been piloted and to be scaled up to cover district levels in the new strategy.

**Fig 2. Dominant features/pathways of theory of change**

1. There is no documented sustained contribution to the outcome level as it relates to the four measurable impact areas.

2. At the intermediate outcome level, the 'public debate' side of the theory has overwhelmingly dominated - during the election 2015, through TV and radio shows, and the Kigoma public agency experiment, as well as the initiation of debates in connection with media coverage on Twitter and Jamii Forum. The latter debates are claimed by Twaweza to have taken place but not verified by evidence. 'Awareness' has been addressed somewhat through the public debates and perception studies. Knowledge has been shared and disseminated; the 'policies' side has been limited to selective legislations and 'plans' and 'budget's not influenced at any significant degree (some planning efforts introduced in Kigoma and minor but useful efforts to introduce simplified accounting monitoring systems at local level). There is anecdotal evidence on changing 'actions', 'behaviour' and 'norms' side, but it has not been possible to track the reach of these intermediate outcomes due to lack of credible data.

3. The output level displays a significant volume produced (evidenced in the Effectiveness section) and particularly on the 'evidence' side of the theory (that may or may not always intertwine). Less can be observed on the 'idea' and 'stories' side. The 'evidence' mainly constituting data delivery through data from SzW and Uwezo, and selected but numerous surveys, studies and research activities, often packaged to media outlets and shared directly with stakeholders (e.g. politicians, MPs).
3 Conclusions and Lessons Learned

3.1 CONCLUSIONS

Relevance

1) The Strategy has become increasingly challenged during the Strategy period 2015-2018 as the increasing shrinking civic space made it harder to influence government policies and actions through the public debate and deliberations envisioned in the Strategy.

2) Conformity has been observed between Twaweza’s priorities and the policies and needs/demand from donors and intermediate actors, such as media and other CSOs.

3) The four major interventions all fall within Twaweza’s overall theory of change, but the degree to which they refer to, reflect upon and feed back into the theory, differed. The SzW was considered highly relevant; KiuFunza relevant yet very narrowly reflecting the overall theory of change; Kigoma-Ujiji local government intervention highly relevant as Twaweza also moved increasingly towards local activity levels in 2017; the Election 2015 was relevant focusing on active citizens and accountable politicians, though implementation turned patchy.

4) Twaweza did not change the theory of change fundamentally during the implementation of the Strategy, though the increasing civic space restrictions occurred and there was a switch from a national-oriented focus early on in the period towards a more decentralised focus during the latter part of the period. Important reflections on the overall approach and strategy can be observed towards the end of the strategy period.

5) Activities on evidence and data on service delivery seems to some extent to have been reduced in the second half of the Strategy period or at least they are not reported on to the same extent as in the first half. Data however shows that citizens prioritise service delivery and that focusing on service delivery is recommended in the 2014 evaluation.

6) Twaweza limited itself in identifying key problems and concerns for its theory of change and Strategy design as it applied its analysis on a single methodology only, the problem-driven iterative adaptation.

Effectiveness

7) Based on a detailed analysis of the two domains and the LME over the four-year Strategy period it is concluded that the activity level has been high in the two main domains, leading to numerous outputs, particularly as regards the ‘evidence’ side (data production) of the theory of change. These data are in a package format distributed online, through media and directly to government officials and politicians. They have contributed to public debates and overall reach at the intermediate outcome level, which is an important achievement in Tanzania. At the outcome level evidence on lasting and institutionalised change is limited.

8) The numerous activities and outputs related to data evidence production have been too scattered. Based on the documentation available to the team, follow-up on activities and in-
Intermediate outcomes produced in the two domains and LME have been limited. Opportunities to build up strength on results from activities that could lead towards intermediate outcomes and sustained outcomes have not been fully utilised.

9) Almost 60% of the Twaweza benchmarks were achieved over the 2015-2017 period, considered only a somewhat successful accomplishment despite the restrictive socio-political context.

10) The many different measurement tools applied by Twaweza (hypotheses, key metrics, benchmarks, outputs, outcomes, etc.) have been inefficient for effective measurement of progress and achievements of the Strategy. Twaweza has spent abundance of time on reporting on these as to meet transparency and accountability while simplified systems would have sufficed and achieved the same.

Efficiency

11) Twaweza spent about 75% of its planned budget for the implementation of the Strategy during the four years. This is considered relatively efficient considering the limitations put on the organisation as a result of the strained political context in the country, particularly during the last half-year of 2018.

12) A brief comparison based on basic parameters between Twaweza and two like-minded organisations shows that Twaweza’s operations are relatively more expensive. Twaweza is highly efficient as regards its management (operations and financial management), being highly automated and following recognised standards and principles. The website is however of poor quality and the time spent on reporting on many indicators of progress and achievements also indicates some degree of inefficiency.

13) 16 out of the 20 of Twaweza’s main partners entered into formal contracts or MoUs indicating a sufficient degree of efficiency applied by Twaweza’s in its relationship with partners. Yet, while collaboration has shown an overall ad hoc nature there is no doubt that Twaweza has provided significant support to partners in their ability to become more innovative and enabled them to strengthen their organisations.

Sustainability

14) Partners’ perceptions of real and potentially sustained benefits produced in collaboration with Twaweza are high. 17 out of 20 partners claim sustainability if Twaweza would leave. However, limited evidence is provided as to verify such claims.

15) The close work with the government in the education sector produced some sustained benefits. Early involvement of government in work processes in the basic education domain has catered for such sustained results.

16) In comparison to the education problem area, efforts to develop sustained benefits in the Open Government domain have been less obvious. This is due to the gradual civic space restrictiveness imposed by government, but also because of Twaweza’s less strategic focus in their choice of activities.

17) Twaweza contributed to policy change in the Open Government area, primarily through its input and improvements to the Access to Information Act. It further developed its activities on analysing and commenting on bills over the strategy period. Whereas the effect of these activities was not always clear, it did help inform decision-makers and the public about the implications of upcoming legislation.
The LME has developed sustained institutional results with the creation of an internal advisory body on research and evaluation (REAG) and the staff expansion of the LME Unit.

Impact

By the end of 2018, Twaweza wanted to have made a measurable impact on four development dimensions, i.e. school children for learning; authorities’ responsiveness to public demands; accessing information for deep accountability; and transforming government practices based on evidenced knowledge. While these ambitious impacts were clearly aimed at by Twaweza they were apart from the ‘school learning’ only achieved to a limited extent.

It was obviously a highly ambitious theory Twaweza embarked upon in 2015. Even before the setbacks in 2015 onwards, civic space was restricted in Tanzania. A precondition for achieving the measurable impact was thus the continued democratisation and expansion of civic space in Tanzania. This did not occur, and government restrictions increased. These factors points to the fact that the government play a bigger role than reflected in Twaweza’s theory.

SDG data has been increasingly included in the Twaweza databases, particularly educational data (Uwezo) but also government related data, such as social sector data, including health and water.

3.2 LESSONS LEARNED

The Strategy 2015-18 Twaweza had as its point of departure that lasting changes are driven by the actions of motivated citizens (p. 3). A main means to achieve this is informed public debate, which in turn will promote responsive public authorities and influence policies and plans. However, this chain of actions and effects proved challenging during the strategy period as documented in this evaluation. This is partly related to the shrinking civic space during the strategy period, but it would have been challenging in the Tanzanian context even prior to this development, and partly due to a fragmented activity approach by Twaweza.

When it comes to achieving sustained change, Twaweza’s more tangible outcomes come from sustained engagement with key decision-makers and government authorities related to solid evidence from research and data platforms like Uwezo and Sauti za Wananchi. Data on service delivery has attracted the attention of government authorities throughout the period and opened the door for interaction and allowed for influence, not least in the education sector.

By comparison, Twaweza lost its platform for interaction in the Open Government element of its work with the government withdrawal from the Open Government Partnership at the end of 2017 and it did not manage to establish new ones on a sustained basis. As a reaction to this, Twaweza developed a push back approach to the shrinking civic space over the strategy period. This included the analysis of and commenting on bills, coalition building with other NGOs, more localised activities as well as an increased emphasis on advocacy, not least related to the laws affecting civic space.

Whereas there is evidence that such activities produced some results early in the strategy period the effect later in the period is unclear from Twaweza’s reporting. They also pose a risk to Twaweza’s activities as demonstrated with the blocking of further publication of SzW data from the middle of 2018 onwards.
Major changes in the new Strategy (2019-2022) and its theory of change include the divesting of the basic education work to a new entity, more activities with change agents and local governments in selected areas and playing down the ambition to foster a responsive government at the national level, at least in the short term. Twaweza at the national level will then amplify local experiences. Whereas most vision and values from the old Strategy are upheld, the mission has changed from collecting evidence to inspire citizens and stimulate responsiveness from authorities (p. 9), the new Strategy aims at demonstrating how citizen can come together and address problems, enable them to be heard and promote and protect civic space (p. 13). The main lesson in this context is that people may come together to address problems, but these problems should clearly reflect perceived and actual needs and demands by citizens (and local officials). Otherwise Twaweza’s efforts may eventually be in vain.

The changes provide for a less ambitious approach. At the same time, it can also be seen as both more and less realistic in terms of what an NGO can achieve in Tanzania in terms of sustained outcomes. It can be seen as more realistic in that the measurable impacts are more process oriented and focusing on gradual improvements. It can be seen as less realistic in that it takes citizen agency as its point of departure. As demonstrated in this evaluation, evidence on the effect of citizen agency is limited.

In this regard it is also worth noting that the lessons from Twaweza’s first strategy period summarised in the 2015-18 Strategy suggest that ‘some of our notable successes were achieved precisely in the policy environment and less where we had expected it: change driven by citizens’ (p. 7). Similarly, the new Strategy suggests that ‘the overall citizen agency picture – seeking information, monitoring delivery, speaking out in public and taking action – is complicated and generally weak’ (p. 5). It is unclear what role service delivery, which hitherto has been a key component and opened the door to engagement with government authorities, is to play.
4 Recommendations

Relevance

1) When Twaweza embarks on identifying key problems and concerns as well as assign major interventions, thorough and diversified analytic methods should apply. This will contribute to the design of a more realistic theory of change and development of improved pathways to its realisation.

2) Due to the fast socio-political context the theory of change should be regularly subject to review, e.g. every sixth month.

3) Twaweza should re-think its approach to service delivery so to better reflect the fact that evidence and data collection on service delivery are in demand as it is the most important need perceived by its main target group, Tanzanian citizens.

Effectiveness

4) Twaweza should continue contributing to public debates in Tanzania through the generation of evidence and experiments, but balance thoughtfully this against development goals, that is, delivering and sustaining results.

5) Twaweza should continue its high activity level, follow-up on those activities that have potential to drive the theory of change forward, i.e. identifying improved pathways for improved opportunities for change.

6) Twaweza should review the results matrix, simplify, and continue describing activities and outputs and ensure that they are clear and logically linked towards effects. In the light of achieved outcomes – or the lack of them – regularly revisit the Strategy’s theory of change, including initiate alternative entries to problem analysis and adjust hypotheses and activities accordingly. The number of assessment tools should be reduced, including benchmarks.

7) In order to become more precise on how to achieve intermediate outcomes and outcomes, Twaweza should analyse and more clearly distinguish between what it can control itself, what it can influence directly or through partners and what is required by other actors to achieve outcomes.

Efficiency

8) Twaweza should continue its efforts to improve its value for money, through, for example, continuous application of advanced technology, ensure that trained staff apply learned skills and when possible adjust salary levels.

9) Twaweza should expand on its partner networking, formalise relationships whenever possible but balance realistically against plans. Efforts should particularly be on supporting partners in their monitoring and evaluation knowledge and skills to ensure their enableness to manage projects in general but particular those initiated/facilitated by Twaweza, a process in which Twaweza is already engaged.

Sustainability

10) Related to the fact that some of the main outcomes over the past strategy periods have been achieved through sustained engagement with government authorities, Twaweza should generally seek to engage these authorities prior to initiating major interventions and
incentivise their continuous involvement and participation throughout the project cycle, whenever possible.

11) Given the changing socio-political context in Tanzania Twaweza may further develop its activities targeting and protecting the shrinking civic space, but it should maintain a core of activities related to data and work on service delivery, which have proved a main entry point to positive engagement with government authorities.

12) Overall, focus more on the building of organisational capacity of external partners and stakeholders as this will help institutionalise change. This is the more important as Twaweza currently seems to be pivoting towards activities at the local level where capacity is often limited. It is also important in a context with increasingly centralised decision-making in order to build resilience towards pressure from central government.

13) Internally, develop scenarios with different trade-offs between working with the government (generating evidence on service delivery in a non-partisan way) and pursuing a watchdog push back approach. Based on these scenarios and thorough risk analyses identify the manoeuvrability of Twaweza in the current socio-political context and let the outcome help sustain Twaweza’s future strategy and activities as well as its organisational structures.

Impact

14) Efforts have been made by Twaweza to achieve ambitious and measurable outcomes/goals. Yet, circumstances of repressiveness towards the civil space and Twaweza’s too activity-focused approach resulted in low impact. Forward-looking Twaweza should assess impact through development of pathways in which likelihoods of achievements are realistically designed.

15) Twaweza should continue to apply SDG data in both education and government areas when it coincides with its plans. SDGs being a government responsibility Twaweza’s data collection in this area could be a one of several openings into collaboration with the government system for longer term effect.
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